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Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity
in the United States After Samantar: A
Suggested Approach
Christopher D. Totten

Abstract
A concept of immunity for foreign heads of state has existed since ancient times. Such immunity constitutes customary international law (“CIL”) and, when applicable, frees such individuals
from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign nations while carrying out their duties. In the United
States, executive branch guidance is considered determinative on the issue of foreign head-of-state
immunity; however, the executive branch does not always provide suggestions of immunity, or it
may provide suggestions that violate CIL. Drawing upon both US and against foreign sitting and
former heads of state and government officials increasingly are becoming more established and
ma provide additional guidance in the absence of, or as a supplement to, US executive branch
guidance. For example, while relevant international immunity law norms generally prohibit criminal prosecutions by domestic jurisdictions against foreign sitting heads of state and other senior
governmental officials, they allow such suits against former leaders and officials in certain circumstances. Moreover, these same norms permit prosecutions against both sitting and former heads
of state and officials if these prosecutions are commenced by international criminal tribunals (e.g.,
the ongoing International Criminal Court proceeding against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan).
Significantly, the recent US Supreme Court case United States v. Samantar significantly changed
the related doctrine of foreign official immunity in the United States. Samantar essentially removed statutory analysis of foreign official immunity through the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act (“FSIA”) and ostensibly replaced it with traditional common law analysis. In light of this
radical shift in the foreign official immunity inquiry, this Article suggests an analytical approach
that US courts may draw upon in the aftermath of Samantar. Such an approach, reflecting a “totality of circumstances” analysis, combines certain aspects of the existing common law analysis
from the head-of-state context with particular approaches used by courts in the official immunity
context under the FSIA. Finally, in light of both the evolving principle of subsidiarity, which an
increasing number of non-US jurisdictions follow, and the concept of complementarity adopted
by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), this Article attempts to shed light on how US courts
should approach the issue of whether to defer to either the courts of other nations (i.e., subsidiarity)
or to international tribunals (i.e., complementarity) in those specific cases in which these courts
or tribunals are actively proceeding against a head of state or other foreign official who is also
a defendant in a US court. For example, potentially strong policy reasons related to the maintenance of peaceful foreign relations among nations, and equally potent conceptual reasons related
to the sovereignty of individual states, appear to support US courts’ deferring to ongoing or pending non-US, national trials of heads of state and certain foreign government officials, particularly

when these trials have a clear connection to the foreign country and are legitimate. Similarly,
deference to an international criminal tribunal may be appropriate in certain circumstances. This
Article consists of four parts. Part I addresses the US approach to immunity for current and former
foreign heads of state as well as the related issue of foreign official immunity. Part I includes
a discussion of the 2010 US Supreme Court case of Samantar, which addresses foreign official
immunity. Part II explores head-of-state and official immunity under international law, including a discussion of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium decided by the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the Charles Taylor immunity decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the ongoing case by the ICC against Sudanese President Al-Bashir, and relevant international codification on the issue. Part III examines third-party prosecutions of heads of state and
other government officials by other national jurisdictions. This part discusses the jurisdictions of
Germany, Great Britain, and Spain and how they approach immunity from prosecution for foreign
heads of state and officials. Part IV includes an analysis of how US courts should continue to handle the evolving issues of foreign head-of-state and foreign official immunity, particularly in light
of Samantar and recent international developments, including high-profile proceedings involving
heads of state and other governmental officials by the ICC, ICJ, and other international tribunals,
and increased activity by foreign national courts against these individuals.

HEAD-OF-STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER
SAMANTAR: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Dr. Christopher D. Totten *
INTRODUCTION
A concept of immunity for foreign heads of state has existed
since ancient times.1 Such immunity constitutes customary
international law (“CIL”) and, when applicable, frees such
individuals from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign nations while
carrying out their duties.2 In the United States, executive branch
guidance is considered determinative on the issue of foreign
head-of-state immunity; however, the executive branch does not
always provide suggestions of immunity, or it may provide
suggestions that violate CIL.3 Drawing upon both US and
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Kennesaw State University. He has a J.D.
and LL.M. from Georgetown University and an A.B. from Princeton University. He is
also a Commentator/Contributing Editor for the Criminal Law Bulletin (volumes 46 and
47). The author thanks Matthew Bernal for his research assistance.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. 6, intro. note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. See id. at chs. 5–6, intro. notes. Such protections exist in order to foster positive
relations between nations. See id. at ch. 6, intro. note. The guarantee of freedom from
prosecution allows for states to exchange representatives without fear of persecution.
Daniel Singerman, Comment, It’s Still Good to Be the King: An Argument for Maintaining the
Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 413, 418 (2007).
Furthermore, the prohibition on allowing states to prosecute certain officials and
representatives from foreign nations promotes respect for national sovereignty by
disallowing one state from passing judgment on the actions of another. See id. The
system, or framework, of immunity works on a basis of reciprocity; one nation must treat
another’s representative on equal footing. See id.
3. For the idea that executive branch guidance is determinative on the issue of
sitting-head-of-state immunity analysis, see infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text
(citing and discussing relevant case law). For the role of executive branch guidance for
former head-of-state immunity, see infra note 67 and accompanying text (citing and
discussing relevant case law). For a discussion of the independent court analysis in cases
in which executive branch guidance is not forthcoming, see infra notes 49–56, 60 and
accompanying text (citing and discussing relevant case law). For a thorough discussion
of the nebulous nature of the head-of-state immunity inquiry in the United States,
including the problems associated with executive branch (e.g., State Department)
guidance on the head-of-state immunity issue (e.g., arbitrariness, inconsistency,
unfairness, and undue political influence) and the overall dearth of judicial cases, see
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international law, this Article endeavors to establish an analytical
framework for US courts to use when such suggestions of
immunity are not provided.4 In particular, certain contextual
factors such as waiver by the foreign nation and the nature of the
conduct of the foreign head of state may be considered.5 In
addition, international law norms governing domestic suits
Jerrold Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of
Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 183–88, 197 (1986). In light of the uncertain nature of
the head-of-state inquiry, Mallory proposes that legislation should be passed by the US
Congress on the head-of-state immunity issue that is similar to existing legislation on
immunity for foreign states (e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)). See
id. at 187–92, 197. Since the time of the often-cited Mallory article, customary
international law has become more developed in the area of head-of-state immunity (in
particular, with respect to foreign national prosecutions), and international criminal
tribunals have been created to prosecute leading government officials, including heads
of state, for grave crimes. This Article will address the impact of these developments up
to the present time on the issue of head-of-state immunity. There are only a few articles
that have addressed the issue of head-of-state immunity in the US in light of the recent
burst of international activity in this area, but few, if any, have seriously attempted to
synthesize and harmonize US domestic law in this area with both international norms
and the law of an increasing number of foreign jurisdictions. This Article seeks to do this
while also addressing the related doctrine of official immunity in light of the landmark
2010 US Supreme Court case of United States v. Samantar. For articles that have
examined the issue of head-of-state immunity in light of international law developments
in this area, see Kaitlin R. O’Donnell, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of
Congo v. France) and Head of State Immunity: How Impenetrable Should The Immunity Veil
Remain?, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 375, 379 (2008) (noting that a recent decision of the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) declining to issue provisional measures to stop
France from investigating alleged international crimes in the Congo by its senior
leaders, including the Congolese head of state, signals a positive change from
“upholding a head of state’s immunity because the executive is one and the same as the
state, to promoting governmental transparency, remedies for human rights violations,
and individual accountability”); Singerman, supra note 2 (arguing for maintaining the
current US and international systems for head-of-state immunity); and Brent Wible, “De–
Jeopardizing Justice”: Domestic Prosecutions for International Crimes and the Need for
Transnational Convergence, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 285–90, 293–95 (2002)
(reviewing international developments in head-of-state immunity and arguing in general
that certain steps must be taken to harmonize national prosecutions of international
crimes). For a further discussion of Republic of Congo v. France in the ICJ case, see infra
note 98.
4. Under the traditional Restatement approach, immunity conferred to sitting
heads of state and certain high officials, such as a minister for foreign affairs, is
considered absolute as it stems from the sovereignty of the state. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, at. ch. 5, intro. note (1987). Nonetheless, modern US courts have
considered executive branch guidance determinative on the issue of immunity. See infra
notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
5. For a further discussion of these contextual factors, see infra notes 179–183 and
accompanying text (head-of-state analysis) and infra notes 192–195 (former-head-of-state
analysis).
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against foreign sitting and former heads of state and government
officials increasingly are becoming more established and may
provide additional guidance in the absence of, or as a
supplement to, US executive branch guidance. For example,
while relevant international immunity law norms generally
prohibit criminal prosecutions by domestic jurisdictions against
foreign sitting heads of state and other senior governmental
officials, they allow such suits against former leaders and officials
in certain circumstances.6 Moreover, these same norms permit
prosecutions against both sitting and former heads of state and
officials if these prosecutions are commenced by international
criminal tribunals (e.g., the ongoing International Criminal
Court proceeding against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan).7
Significantly, the recent US Supreme Court case United States
v. Samantar significantly changed the related doctrine of foreign
official immunity in the United States. Samantar essentially
removed statutory analysis of foreign official immunity through
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (“FSIA”) and ostensibly
replaced it with traditional common law analysis.8 In light of this
radical shift in the foreign official immunity inquiry, this Article
suggests an analytical approach that US courts may draw upon in
the aftermath of Samantar. Such an approach, reflecting a
“totality of circumstances” analysis, combines certain aspects of
the existing common law analysis from the head-of-state context

6. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶ 47 (May 31, 2003); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). According to the ICJ in Congo v.
Belgium,
a court of one State may try a former [senior official or head of state] of
another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her
period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of
office in a private capacity.
Id. ¶ 61.
7. For example, the statutes of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all decline to
recognize immunity from prosecution for grave crimes committed by heads of state and
other governmental officials. See infra note 184. For further discussion of the ICC
proceeding against the President of Sudan, as well as proceedings by other international
tribunals against heads of state, see infra note 117.
8. See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). For a further discussion
of Samantar, see infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
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with particular approaches used by courts in the official
immunity context under the FSIA.9
Finally, in light of both the evolving principle of subsidiarity,
which an increasing number of non-US jurisdictions follow, and
the concept of complementarity adopted by the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), this Article attempts to shed light on
how US courts should approach the issue of whether to defer to
either the courts of other nations (i.e., subsidiarity) or to
international tribunals (i.e., complementarity) in those specific
cases in which these courts or tribunals are actively proceeding
against a head of state or other foreign official who is also a
defendant in a US court.10 For example, potentially strong policy
reasons related to the maintenance of peaceful foreign relations
among nations, and equally potent conceptual reasons related to
the sovereignty of individual states, appear to support US courts’
deferring to ongoing or pending non-US, national trials of heads
of state and certain foreign government officials, particularly
when these trials have a clear connection to the foreign country
and are legitimate. Similarly, deference to an international
criminal tribunal may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I addresses the US
approach to immunity for current and former foreign heads of
state as well as the related issue of foreign official immunity. Part
I includes a discussion of the 2010 US Supreme Court case of
Samantar, which addresses foreign official immunity. Part II
explores head-of-state and official immunity under international
law, including a discussion of Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium decided by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the
Charles Taylor immunity decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the ongoing case by the ICC against Sudanese President
Al-Bashir, and relevant international codification on the issue.
Part III examines third-party prosecutions of heads of state and
other government officials by other national jurisdictions.11 This

9. For a detailed description of this totality of circumstances approach to official
immunity analysis, see infra pp. 146–47.
10. For further discussion of subsidiarity, see infra Part III.B (discussing the cases of
Spain and Germany). For a further discussion of the issue of complementarity within the
ICC, see infra notes 184–189 and accompanying text.
11. Third-party prosecution in this context is intended to mean a prosecution by a
jurisdiction for a crime that occurred in another state, and neither the accused nor the
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part discusses the jurisdictions of Germany, Great Britain, and
Spain and how they approach immunity from prosecution for
foreign heads of state and officials. Part IV includes an analysis of
how US courts should continue to handle the evolving issues of
foreign head-of-state and foreign official immunity, particularly
in light of Samantar and recent international developments,
including high-profile proceedings involving heads of state and
other governmental officials by the ICC, ICJ, and other
international tribunals, and increased activity by foreign national
courts against these individuals.
I.

HEAD-OF-STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY: US
APPROACH
A. Origins

In the United States, the concept of head-of-state immunity
and foreign sovereign immunity for states can be traced to the
1812 US Supreme Court case of The Schooner Exchange.12 In fact,
though the Court’s direct holding in The Schooner Exchange dealt
with the immunity of a foreign ship physically located in the US
port of Philadelphia, the case’s greater significance is its
establishment of the doctrine of absolute immunity of foreign
sovereigns.13 In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that, while states generally enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
their territory (as an attribute of their sovereignty), states have
conceded, or “waived,” a part of this jurisdiction in order to
conduct foreign relations. One “part” of this absolute
jurisdiction that has been waived, according to Marshall, is “the
exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or
detention within a foreign territory.”14
Though the head-of-state immunity concept first arose in US
jurisprudence in The Schooner Exchange, very few cases implicating
victim is a citizen or national of the prosecuting jurisdiction. Such a prosecution
generally proceeds under the theory of universal jurisdiction.
12. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
13. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)
(“Although the narrow holding of The Schooner Exchange was only that the courts of the
United States lack jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign state found in [a US]
port, that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to
foreign sovereigns.”).
14. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137.
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the concept appeared in the United States prior to the late
twentieth century.15 In fact, the concept became subsumed, for
the most part, within the broader principle of “absolute foreign
sovereign immunity for states.”16 Since the late twentieth century,
however, head-of-state immunity has emerged in the United
States as its own distinct concept.17 In Tachiona v. Mugabe, Judge
Marrero articulated several reasons why the number of litigated
cases against heads of state for issues related to their unofficial,
private conduct may have increased in the US in the late
twentieth century.18 These reasons include, according to
Marrerro, the undertaking by heads of state of more personal
business opportunities in the expanded international trade
market and the accompanying greater exposure to lawsuits such
opportunities may bring.19 In addition, with the recent increase
in the body of substantive international criminal law norms,
15. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 275 & n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d
on other grounds, Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In this
precedential void, . . . [US] courts, on the few occasions in which the principle of
sovereign immunity was asserted [prior to 1976] in connection with an action filed
against a head-of-state, regarded the conceptual issue as subsumed within the
recognized principle of absolute sovereign immunity for states and governed by The
Schooner Exchange doctrine. This treatment suggested the existence of a unified theory of
sovereign immunity integrating the traditional notion that the sovereign and its ruler
were one and the same, concepts that had not yet branched into distinct doctrines
subject to their own separate policies, standards and applications.” (citing Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—Suggestion by the
Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 529 (1994); Shoba Varughese George, Head of
State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still Confused after All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1051, 1055 (1995))).
16. Id. at 275–76 (“[A]ny reference to a head-of-state immunity ‘doctrine’ as a
concept distinct from foreign state immunity is a construct that does not arise in the case
law and commentary as a specifically identified and widely recognized legal principle
until after 1976.” (citing Dellapenna, supra note 15, at 529–30)). Note, however, that if a
plaintiff attempts to mask a suit against a state by suing its head, US courts still generally
treat the suit as one against the state: “Ordinarily, a proceeding against a head of state or
government that is in essence a suit against the state is treated like a claim against the
state for purposes of immunity.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporters’ Notes ¶
14 (1987).
17. After 1976 and the passage of FSIA, US courts are increasingly treating head-ofstate immunity and foreign sovereign immunity for the state itself as both different and
unique concepts, each with its own separate issues. See Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d. at 277–
78 & n.68 (describing several cases recognizing head-of-state immunity as a distinct
concept).
18. Id. at 278.
19. See id. (citing First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1112–13 (D.D.C.
1996); Lasidi, S.A. v. Financiera Avenida, S.A., No. 5864/52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1988), aff’d 538 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1989)).
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plaintiffs have begun to use the courts to redress violations of
these norms, including violations by heads of state.20
Traditionally, under the theory of absolute foreign sovereign
immunity, states that were sued in US courts made special
appearances to assert immunity, resulting in dismissal of the
suit.21 In particular, in the twentieth century, foreign states
increasingly contacted the US State Department to request that
the Department of Justice make a “suggestion of immunity” to
the presiding court.22 As early as 1943, the US Supreme Court
ruled that a suggestion of immunity from the executive branch
must be accepted by the courts.23 The suggestion was found to be
a conclusive decision, and to proceed would interfere with the
conduct of foreign relations.24 In 1945, the Court reasserted that
it is not the courts’ place to make decisions to deny or grant
immunity, but rather this authority lies within the executive
branch.25 This deference to the executive branch has continued
to this day in the particular context of head-of-state immunity26
(but, notably, not foreign sovereign immunity).27

20. Id. at 278–81 (citing Dellapenna, supra note 15, at 529–31; George, supra note
15 at 1051–52, 1054). Another reason identified by Judge Marrero in Tachiona dealt with
the passage of FSIA in 1976, which is discussed infra notes 29–47 and accompanying
text. Judge Marrero said:
[S]ome plaintiffs, aware that suits naming the state directly are explicitly
barred by the FSIA, either for tactical effect or to test the substantive contours
of the Act’s exceptions, have sought to assert theories of liability that extend to
foreign officials not only as “agencies or instrumentalities” of the state, but in
their personal capacities.
Id. at 278 (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990);
Dellapenna, supra note 15 at 530).
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at ch. 5, intro. note (1987).
22. Id.
23. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, at ch. 5, intro. note (1987).
24. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589.
25. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945); see also Ye v.
Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at ch. 5 intro.
note (1987).
26. See Ye, 383 F.3d at 625–26 (“The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity is conclusive and not subject to judicial
inquiry.” (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589; Compañia Española de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617
(5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d
Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961))).
27. See infra Part I.B.
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In 1952, the Acting Legal Adviser of the US Department of
State, Jack B. Tate, wrote to the Acting Attorney General setting
forth the department’s position on foreign sovereign immunity.28
The Tate Letter asserted that the department would henceforth
follow the more limited form of immunity known as the
restrictive theory.29 This theory essentially recognizes the
immunity of the sovereign for public acts but not for private,
commercial acts.30 The practice of immunity decisions by the
State Department using the restrictive theory, however, soon
came under criticism, particularly for its inconsistency.31
B.

Head-of-State Immunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, and
the Common Law

By the 1970s, both the practicing bar and Department of
State sought to relieve the department of its role of ruling on
sovereign immunity claims; a more precise and codified set of
standards were sought to correct this system.32 After more than a
decade of debate, the US Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”) to streamline the sovereign
immunity decision system.33 The FSIA is premised on the
restrictive theory of immunity, and places US courts in charge of
the immunity determination once a claim of immunity is raised

28. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 25 Dep't St. Bull. 984–85
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
562–63 (5th ed. 2007).
29. Tate Letter, supra note 28; see also CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 564–65 (“For
a few years after the Tate Letter, the State Department usually made decisions on
sovereign immunity claims by a foreign state on the basis of the foreign government’s
submission. Criticism of this procedure, however, led the Department’s Office of Legal
Adviser to conduct quasi-judicial hearings on whether a particular claim of immunity was
within the Tate Letter’s criteria.”).
30. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698, 711,
714 (1976) (citing Tate Letter, supra note 28).
31. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 566 (“This regime [created in the Tate
Letter], under which the State Department made some immunity determinations and
the courts made others, did not always produce consistent decisions.”).
32. Id. (“Unhappiness with the process for deciding immunity under the Tate
Letter and a desire for greater predictability led private lawyers, scholars, and the
Department of State to push for legislation establishing more precise criteria.”)
33. Id. at 568; see Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (2006).
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by the foreign state.34 In general, FSIA presumes immunity on
the part of the foreign state being sued; however, there are
various exceptions to this immunity.35 These exceptions include
any explicit or implicit waiver of immunity by the foreign state;36
a counterclaim to a suit commenced by a foreign state in the
United States;37 certain commercial activity engaged in by the
foreign state;38 certain noncommercial torts committed by the

34. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 568 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 7, 12
(1976)).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (“Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act[,] a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”); see also CARTER ET
AL., supra note 28, at 568 (“Under this [FSIA] structure, a court must determine
whether the foreign state defendant is immune from suit in order to determine whether
the court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction. If the court finds that the
defendant is immune, the court lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
Conversely, if the court finds that there is an exception to immunity, and that proper
service has been made, the court automatically has personal and subject matter
jurisdiction (assuming no violation of due process requirements).”) For the relevant
provisions of the various exceptions to immunity, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–07; see also infra
notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1) (2006) (effective January 28, 2008) (“A foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
in any case—(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver . . . .”). At least one
judge has argued that a state’s violation of a customary international law norm
constitutes a waiver. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1185–86
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wald, J., dissenting). The majority trend reflected in US case law,
however, appears to go against this argument (e.g., that a violation of a jus cogens norm
by a state should constitute a waiver). See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 586.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (“In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a
foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state
shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim—(a) for which a
foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under section 1605 of this chapter had
such claim been brought in a separate action against the foreign state; or (b) arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign
state; or (c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in
amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.”).
38. See id. § 1605 (a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . .”).
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foreign state;39 particular types of expropriation actions by
foreign states;40 and actions attempting to enforce arbitral awards
or agreements.41 Formerly, there was an additional immunity
exception under FSIA for terrorist actions by certain foreign
states; however, this exception has now been repealed.42
39. See id. § 1605(a)(5) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . not otherwise encompassed
[by the commercial activity exception in § 1605(a)(2)], in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within
the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to—(A) any
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any claim
arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights . . . .”).
40. See id. § 1605(a)(3) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property
taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property
exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property
or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States . . . .”).
41. See id. § 1605(a)(6) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is
brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the
benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant
to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to
take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a
treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the
agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this
section or section 1607, or [the waiver exception in § 1605(a)(1)] is otherwise
applicable.”). For the text of § 1607, see supra note 37.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. 110–181, 122 Stat. 341, Div. A, § 1083(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“A foreign
state [that is a designated supporter of terrorism] shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . (7) not
otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.”). For additional explanation of
the designated state supporter of terrorism requirement and for a list of states that have
been so designated by the US government, see CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 603. The
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According to most US courts, FSIA and its exceptions do not
generally apply to suits against heads of state.43 Rather, using the
common law approach first introduced in The Schooner Exchange,
US courts look directly to the executive branch for guidance on
the issue of head-of-state immunity.44 For example, in Lafontant v.
US Congress has allowed punitive damages to be sought against officials associated with
states who sponsor terrorism or who engage in the relevant terrorist acts. See id. at 604;
see also Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub.L. 104–208, 110 Stat.
3009–172, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c) (“An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his or her
office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national . . . for personal
injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of
the United States may maintain jurisdiction [under 28 U.S.C. Section 1605 (a)(7)] for
money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering,
and punitive damages . . . .”). Even prior to the Civil Liability Act, state agencies and
instrumentalities (but not individuals) who were designated sponsors of terrorism could
be sued for punitive damages. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 604 (referring to 28
U.S.C. § 1606).
43. For example, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in United
States v. Noriega:
[The] FSIA “contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims
of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.” It codified the State Department’s
general criteria for making suggestions of immunity, and transferred the
responsibility for case-by-case application of these principles from the
Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch. Because the FSIA addresses neither headof-state immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context, head-of-state
immunity could attach in cases, such as this one, only pursuant to the principles and
procedures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its progeny. As a result, this
court must look to the Executive Branch for direction on the propriety of
Noriega's immunity claim.
United States. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added
and omitted) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488
(1983) (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Enahoro
v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In our case, we conclude, based on
the language of the statute, that the FSIA does not apply to General Abubakar [as
an individual member of a ruling committee, or junta, in Nigeria that exerted
considerable control over that country]; it is therefore also clear that the Act does
not provide jurisdiction over the case.”). Specifically, the court in Enahoro said that
“[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity in the
scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.” Id. at
881–82.
44. See Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211–12 (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486) (“The
principles of international comity outlined by the Court in The Schooner Exchange led to
the development of a general doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity which courts
applied most often to protect foreign nations in their corporate form from civil process
in the United States. . . . As this doctrine emerged, the ‘Court consistently . . . deferred
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive
Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and
their instrumentalities.’”); see also infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (explaining
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Aristide, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
found that the US executive branch’s suggestion of immunity for
defendant Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whom it recognized as the
official head of state of Haiti, was conclusive: “The [US] State
Department [within the executive branch] has submitted a letter
of immunity. It speaks for the President of the United States. Its
suggestion of immunity is controlling with respect to President
Aristide. The court must defer to the Executive on this matter.”45
Additionally, in Ye v. Zemin, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered the US executive branch’s suggestion
of immunity for Chinese head of state Jiang Zemin to be
conclusive: “In the present case the Executive Branch has
recognized the immunity of President Jiang from the [plaintiff’s]
suit. The district court was correct to accept this recognition as
conclusive.”46 Moreover, in Tachiona v. Mugabe, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted immunity to the
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Foreign Minister
Stan Mudenge for various crimes as a result of the US executive
branch’s suggestion of immunity.47 The court commented that
that judicial deference to suggestions of immunity by the executive branch applies in the
particular context of head-of-state immunity); supra notes 23–25.
45. 844 F. Supp. 128, 139–40 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Plaintiff Lafontant sued President of
Haiti Aristide for his alleged role in ordering the execution of plaintiff’s husband.
Aristide apparently had this execution carried out by other officers in his government
because plaintiff’s husband participated in a failed coup aimed at ousting Aristide from
power. See id. at 130.
46. 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he immunity of foreign leaders remains
the province of the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch's determination that a
foreign leader should be immune from suit even when the leader is accused of acts that
violate jus cogens norms is established by a suggestion of immunity.”). In Ye, plaintiffs,
who were members of a Chinese spiritual movement known as the Falun Gong, sued
Chinese President Zemin for acts of “torture, genocide, arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment, as well as other claims related to the [plaintiffs’] freedom of conscience,
movement, and religion.” Id. at 622.
47. 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In that case, “[p]laintiffs charge[d]
that defendants’ lawless conduct included ‘murder, torture, terrorism, rape, beatings,
and destruction of property.” Id. at 265. Plaintiffs were persecuted as a result of their
status as members of the political opposition in Zimbabwe at the time. See id. at 265–66;
see also First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1121 (D.D.C. 1996)
(finding that defendants were not entitled to head-of-state immunity, in part because the
US executive branch did not issue a suggestion of immunity on their behalf); Estate of
Domingo v. Republic of the Phillippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
(denying head-of-state immunity to former President Ferdinand Marcos of the
Phillippines, in part because the US State Department failed to file a suggestion of
immunity on his behalf at the time of the suit, after he had left office). For a list of other
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“the FSIA does not serve to abrogate the State Department’s
decisive role in the recognition of head-of-state immunity, nor to
negate the head-of-state immunity invoked here by the State
Department on behalf of [the Zimbabwean officials].”48
When the Executive Branch does not put forth a suggestion
of immunity, some courts undertake an independent analysis of
the immunity issue. For example, in a case involving alleged
embezzlement of funds by the former President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals suggested in dicta that: “[w]hen lacking guidance from
the executive branch [on the head-of-state immunity issue], as
here, a court is left to decide for itself whether a head-of-state is
or is not entitled to immunity.”49 Despite this suggestion by the
court, it ultimately declined to reach the merits of the head-ofstate immunity issue for former President Marcos.50 Rather, the
court held that the successor government in the Philippines
waived Marcos’ head-of-state immunity.51
Furthermore, in Spacil v. Crowe, though the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit believed it must follow the executive
branch’s suggestion of immunity when it exists,52 the court also
found that absent such a suggestion, the judicial branch may
cases in which US courts followed the executive branch’s suggestion of immunity, see
Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
48. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d. at 296–97.
49. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988). The suit arose because Marcos
refused to respond to a subpoena requiring him to turn over certain bank records. Id. at
42.
50. Id. at 45. The court declined to reach the merits of the head-of-state immunity
issue because it believed either Congress or the President were, under the US
Constitution, the branches of government both authorized and best suited to address
such an issue. Id.
51. Id. at 46.
52. 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The precedents are overwhelming. For
more than 160 years American courts have consistently applied the doctrine of sovereign
immunity when requested to do so by the executive branch. Moreover, they have done
so with no further review of the executive’s determination.”) The court in Spacil found
that the executive branch’s suggestion of immunity was controlling and held that “the
executive’s decision to recognize and allow a claim of foreign sovereign immunity binds
the judiciary, and that no further review of the executive’s action is dictated.” Id. at 620–
21. The court based its holding primarily “on the role of secrecy in foreign relations.” Id.
at 620. It believed that the executive branch was in the best position to make an
immunity determination because the foreign relations power was assigned to that
branch by the Constitution; in addition, the executive had both more expertise and
resources in dealing with a foreign relations question such as an immunity
determination. Id. at 619.
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make its own determination of immunity: “We do not doubt the
propriety of courts deciding questions of sovereign immunity,
absent executive recognition and allowance of a claim. This has
been the traditional and accepted practice of the courts.”53
Finally, in United States v. Noriega, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit applied the approach suggested in Spacil by
independently evaluating whether defendant Panamanian
General Noriega was entitled to head-of-state immunity.54 The
court found that, based on certain evaluation criteria such as
Noriega’s status and the nature of his acts, he was not entitled to
such immunity:
[G]iven that the record indicates that Noriega never served
as the constitutional leader of Panama, that Panama has not
sought immunity for Noriega and that the charged acts
relate to Noriega’s private pursuit of personal enrichment
[e.g., drug trafficking], Noriega likely would not prevail even
if this court had to make an independent determination
regarding the propriety of immunity in this case.55

Before offering this independent evaluation of the head-ofstate issue, however, the Court found that the US executive
branch had indicated through its actions that defendant should
not be entitled to immunity: “[B]y pursuing Noriega’s capture
and this prosecution [on drug trafficking charges], the Executive
Branch has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be
denied head-of-state immunity.”56
53. Id. at 618.
54. 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 1212 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)). For a summary of
the charges related to drug trafficking for which the district court convicted Noriega, see
id. at 1209 n.1. Noriega’s official title in Panama at the time of his indictment in the
United States on the drug-related charges was “commander of the Panamanian Defense
Forces in the Republic of Panama.” Id. Also, at this time, the United States recognized
Eric Arturo Delvalle as the constitutional leader of Panama. Id. at 1209–10. The US
government had seized Noriega in Panama and brought him back to US soil to face the
drug charges. See id.
56. Id. at 1212. After noting that the executive branch’s input on the head-of-state
issue can fall within one of three categories (i.e., expressly suggest immunity, expressly
decline immunity, or offer no guidance), the court in Noriega interpreted the holding of
a precedent case—In re Doe—to be “that absent a formal suggestion of immunity, a
putative head of state should receive no immunity.” Id. (citing Doe, 860 F.2d at 45).
Applying this standard, the Noriega court believed that the executive branch, through its
actions, clearly manifested its intent that Noriega be denied immunity. Id. While this
may be one interpretation of Doe, it should be emphasized that in that case the court
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Notably, head-of-state status for purposes of the immunity
determination attaches only to those individuals whom the US
executive branch recognizes as legitimately holding that status.57
For example, in United States v. Noriega, the district court
commented:
In order to assert head of state immunity, a government
official must be recognized as a head of state. Noriega has
never been recognized as Panama’s Head of State . . . by the
United States. . . . [T]he United States government has never
accorded Noriega head of state status, but rather continued
to recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate
leader of Panama while Noriega was in power.58

Moreover, in Lafontant v. Aristide, the district court found
the fact that defendant Aristide was in exile from Haiti and did
not actually control that country’s government to be irrelevant to
the determination of head-of-state status; rather, the controlling
factor for the court was the designation of head-of-state status by
the US executive branch:
[Head-of-state] immunity extends only to the person the
United States government acknowledges as the official headof-state. Recognition of a government and its officers is the
exclusive function of the Executive Branch. Whether the
recognized head-of-state [e.g., Aristide] has de facto control of
the government is irrelevant; the courts must defer to the
Executive determination.59

denied immunity based on the formal waiver by the Philippine government of
defendant Marcos’s immunity. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
57. See PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW,
HISTORY AND ANAYLYSIS 267–68 (2009).
58. 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fl. 1990). The court also explained that
defendant Noriega was also not recognized as head of state by the Panamanian
Constitution. See id. The court found that “[t]he ruling in [Republic of Panama v. Air
Panama, 745 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1988)]—which [it] [found] no reason to depart
from here—was based on a line of case law holding that recognition of foreign
governments and their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy decision committed to
the Executive Branch and thus conclusive upon the courts.” Id. at 1519–20 (citing Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937); Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212–14 (1890); Banco De Espana v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 114
F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1940); Republic of Panama v. Citizens and Southern Int’l Bank,
682 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fl. 1988)).
59. 844 F. Supp. 128, 132–33 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The court also noted that “[US p]residential decisions
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Finally, in Kadic v. Karadžić, the court refused to recognize
defendant Radovan Karadžić as a head of state because the US
executive branch had yet to confer such status on defendant:
Even if such future recognition [of head-of-state status for
Karadžić], determined by the Executive Branch, would
create head-of-state immunity, it would be entirely
inappropriate for a court to create the functional equivalent
of such an immunity based on speculation about what the
Executive Branch might do in the future.60

Moreover, foreign governments may choose to waive the
immunity ordinarily attaching to their heads of state.61 For
example, in Aristide, the court determined that the de facto
military rulers of Haiti had not “waived” defendant Aristide’s
immunity as a sitting head of state: “Here there has been no
explicit waiver of President Aristide’s immunity recognized as a
waiver by the United States. . . . [T]he unrecognized de facto
rulers of Haiti have no power to and have not undertaken any
action accepted by our government as an implicit waiver of
immunity.”62 However, in two other cases, foreign governments
were found to have waived the immunity of their leaders. In a
case examining the possible head-of-state immunity of former
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the successor
government of the Philippines had waived Marcos’s immunity:
We think the waiver [of immunity] should be given full
effect. Head-of-state immunity is founded on the need for
comity among nations and respect for the sovereignty of
other nations; it should apply only when it serves those goals.
In this case, application of the doctrine to Ferdinand . . .
Marcos would clearly offend the present Philippine
government, which has sought to waive . . . Marcos’
immunity, and would therefore undermine the international
comity that the immunity doctrine is designed to promote.
Our view is that head-of-state immunity is primarily an
to recognize a government are binding on the courts, and the courts must give them
legal effect.” Id. at 133 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942)).
60. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988); Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at
133).
61. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 133 (“The government of a foreign state which is
recognized by the Executive Branch may waive its head-of-state immunity.”).
62. Id. at 134.
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attribute of state sovereignty, not an individual right. Respect
for Philippine sovereignty requires us to honor the
Philippine government’s revocation of the head-of-state
immunity of Mr. . . . Marcos.63

Moreover, in Paul v. Avril, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida found that former President of Haiti Prosper
Avril was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for the alleged
atrocities committed under his leadership because the
government of Haiti had waived his immunity.64
C. Former Heads of State
Former heads of state are generally denied immunity in US
courts for acts committed outside their official capacities while in
office (e.g., “private” acts).65 For example, courts may deny
immunity to “a former head-of-state [who committed while in
office] private or criminal acts in violation of American law.”66
63. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110–11 (4th Cir. 1987). Marcos
was seeking immunity from process. Both Marcos and his wife had been subpoenaed to
testify before a US grand jury on alleged corruption charges. See id. at 1109–10.
64. 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fl. 1993). The court said: “Defendant [Avril] next
argues that he is immune from the jurisdictional arm of this court under the Head of
State doctrine. This argument must also fail.” Id. at 211. The court concluded that
“[t]he waiver of immunity by the Haitian government is complete and also affects
[defendant’s] residual head of state immunity.” Id. For the precise language of the
waiver by the Aristide government, see id. at 210. In the waiver, defendant is referred to
as “ex-Lieutenant-General of the Armed Forces of Haiti and former President of the
Military Government of the Republic of Haiti.” Id. According to plaintiffs’ complaint,
plaintiffs sought money damages in their suit against defendant Avril for “[t]orture;
[a]rbitrary [d]etention; [c]ruel, [i]nhuman and [d]egrading [t]reatment; [f]alse
[i]mprisonment; [a]ssault and [b]attery; and [i]ntentional [i]nfliction of [e]motional
[d]istress.” Id. at 209. Defendant allegedly ordered others to commit these acts. See id.
65. See HENNER, supra note 57, at 264 (“Head of state immunity extends only to the
current head of state; it does not extend to former presidents or prime ministers.”).
Courts appear to use a common-law approach to immunity for former heads of state and
do not rely upon FSIA. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464 Reporter’s Note 14 (1987)
(“Former heads of state or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in
respect of claims arising out of their official acts while in office.”).
66. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]ere we to reach the merits of the
issue, we believe there is respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a
former head-of-state for private or criminal acts in violation of American law.” (citing
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135, 144 (1812); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1111; Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360
(2d Cir. 1986)); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporter’s Note 14 (1987)
(“Former heads of state or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in
respect of claims arising out of their official acts while in office.”). The immunity
conferred on former heads of state or high officials, however, does not extend to
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Such denial of immunity has also occurred when the US
executive branch failed to make a suggestion of immunity on
behalf of a former head of state.67 Former heads of state may,
however, claim immunity for acts committed in their official
capacity while in office.68
D. Foreign Official Immunity and FSIA
Most recently, in Samantar v. Yousuf, the US Supreme Court
held that, similar to the case of foreign heads of state, FSIA
immunity does not apply to individual foreign government
officials.69 This holding represents a significant departure from
previous federal lower court jurisprudence finding foreign
government officials immune under FSIA for acts committed
within their official capacity.70 In particular, the Court “agree[d]
violations of international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 404. The court in Doe
did not reach the actual merits of the issue of former head-of-state immunity for the exleader of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, because it found that the successor
Philippine government waived Marcos’s immunity. Id. at 45–46. For further discussion of
Doe, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782
(W.D. Wash. 1988) (denying immunity from suit for former President of the Philippines
Ferdinand Marcos). Estate of Domingo also held that “[h]ead of state immunity serves to
safeguard the relations among foreign governments and their leaders, not as [Marcos]
assert[s], to protect former heads of state regardless of their lack of official status.” Id. at
786. Concerning the immunity question, the district court in Estate of Domingo found
determinative the fact that the US government had not proffered a suggestion of
immunity for Marcos after he left office. Id. The suit against Marcos and other
defendants was for allegedly “plan[ing], execut[ing] and cover[ing] up the murder of
two Filipino union leaders . . . who openly and actively opposed the Marcos regime.” Id.
at 783; see CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 628. (“Similar to the situation with the
present head of state, most courts look to the Executive Branch for guidance [to resolve
the issue of former-head-of-state immunity].”).
68. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporter’s Note 14. (“Former heads of state
or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in respect of claims arising
out of their official acts while in office.”) Note, however, that while a state may not
generally legislate on the former-head-of-state immunity issue, its courts may entertain
claims on the issue. See id. (“Ordinarily, such [official] acts [carrying potential immunity
for the former head of state] are not within the jurisdiction to prescribe of other states.
However, a former head of state appears to have no immunity from jurisdiction to
adjudicate.”).
69. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
70. Prior to the US Supreme Court decision in Samantar, there was a split between
US circuit courts of appeals, but a noticeable trend among these courts was that FSIA
immunity did apply to individual foreign government officers for their official acts. See
HENNER, supra note 57, at 259 (“The principle that an individual can assert FSIA
immunity for actions taken within his or her official capacity has been upheld by at least
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with the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals on its broader ground
that individual officials are not covered by the FSIA . . . .”71 The
Court based its holding on the language, purpose, and history of
FSIA itself:
Although Congress clearly intended [through its passage of
FSIA] to supersede the common-law regime for claims
against foreign states, we find nothing in the statute’s origin
five circuits.”); see, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81
(2d Cir. 2008) (“We join our sister circuits in holding that an individual official of a
foreign state acting in his official capacity is the ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state,
and is thereby protected by the FSIA.”); see also HENNER, supra note 57, at 256–62 & n.57
(discussing split among circuits). In re Terrorist Attacks involved four Saudi princes,
among other defendants. Several of these princes apparently held high positions in the
Saudi government, including Minister of the Interior, Director of the Department of
General Intelligence, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, and First
Deputy President of the Council of Ministers. 538 F.3d at 77; see also Belhas v. Ya’Alon,
515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“An individual qualifies for [FSIA] immunity
when he acts in his official capacity for the state.” (citing Jungquist v. Al Nahyan, 115
F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir.1997))); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815–16
(6th Cir. 2002) (“[N]ormally foreign sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting
in their official capacities as officers of corporations considered foreign sovereigns.”). In
Belhas, the circuit court of appeals found that the defendant, a former Israeli military
general, was immune under the FSIA for official acts he committed that were authorized
by the Israeli government. The court said, “We have no difficulty in holding . . . that the
FSIA does not extend jurisdiction [i.e., it confers immunity] over this action against an
officer for actions committed by the state in whose army he served.” Belhas, 515 F.3d at
1284. The plaintiffs, who were relatives of citizens killed or injured in a shelling by the
Israeli military of a United Nations compound in Lebanon, alleged that the defendant’s
military command responsibility in the shelling constituted “war crimes, extrajudicial
killing, crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” Id. at 1282. But see Enahoro v. Abubakwar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.
2005) (“In our case, we conclude, based on the language of the statute, that the FSIA
does not apply to General Abubakwar [as an individual member of a ruling committee,
or junta, in Nigeria that exerted considerable control over that country]; it is therefore
also clear that the Act does not provide jurisdiction over the case.”). Specifically, the
court in Enahoro said that “[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in the
official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and
unmistakable terms.” Id. at 881–82. Note that even under the prevailing trend of cases
described above, if the foreign government official committed an act not in his official
capacity, FSIA immunity was generally denied. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467,
1470–71 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that former President Marcos was not entitled to FSIA
immunity for his authorization while in office of torture, arbitrary detentions, and
extrajudicial executions, because these acts do not constitute official acts of state);
Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the daughter of
former President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos was not entitled to FSIA
immunity because the crimes she committed were not official acts of the state). For
further discussion of these cases involving the Marcos family, see HENNER, supra note 57,
at 260.
71. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. at 2284 n.5.
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or aims to indicate that Congress similarly wanted to codify
the law of foreign official immunity. Our review of the text,
purpose, and history of the FSIA leads us to the conclusion
that . . . the FSIA does not govern [the defendant foreign
official’s] claim of immunity.72

Notably, Samantar involved a foreign official who allegedly
committed crimes against the plaintiff victims both while a head
of state (i.e., Prime Minister of Somalia) and while a
governmental official of that state (i.e., First Vice President and
Minister of Defense of Somalia).73 The holding in Samantar will
likely widen the scope of permissible suits against foreign
government officials because these officials will no longer enjoy
immunity under the FSIA; however, they will apparently continue
to be subject to potential grants of immunity under the common
law.74
II. HEAD OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY:
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACH
A. International Case Law
1. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge, Mr. Vandermeersch,
issued an international arrest warrant for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi.75 The warrant sought extradition of Yerodia
for alleged breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and
72. Id. at 2292.
73. Id. at 2282. The crimes alleged by the plaintiffs included torture, extrajudicial
killing, and arbitrary detention, and plaintiffs sought money damages from defendant in
his personal capacity as of result of his alleged authorization of these acts. Id. at 2282,
2292.
74. This is analogous to the opportunity for common-law immunity under US law
enjoyed by foreign heads of state. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. Also,
cases involving former officials have generally been analyzed under the common law and
not under the FSIA. For cases analyzing former heads of state immunity under a
common-law approach, see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. For a case
analyzing a former official under a common law approach, see Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d
9 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that it is unresolved whether FSIA applies to former officials but
acknowledging that common-law immunity analysis would apply). See HENNER, supra
note 57, at 262 (citing Matar, 2009 US App. LEXIS at 7877).
75. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium) 2002 I.C.J. 3,
¶¶ 1, 10 (Feb. 14).
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commission of crimes against humanity.76 Specifically, Yerodia
was charged with making numerous speeches inciting racial
hatred during August 1998, punishable in Belgium under the
Law of June 16, 1993.77 Yerodia was neither a Belgian national
nor within Belgium territory at the time the arrest warrant was
circulated.78 The warrant was issued based on complaints filed by
twelve Belgian citizens, five of whom are of Belgian nationality.79
On October 17, 2000, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (“Congo”) filed an application with the Registry of the
International Court of Justice to request that the court order the
warrant annulled.80 The Congo contended that, by issuing the
warrant, Belgium violated international law norms concerning
immunity;81 in particular, that the warrant violated the principle
that one state may not exercise authority over another.82 To
support its claim, the Congo relied upon Article 2 of the Charter
of the United Nations, which establishes the sovereignty of
member states.83 Additionally, the Congo argued that Yerodia was
entitled to a claim of immunity under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”).84
In contrast, Belgium sought to have the ICJ case dismissed,
contending that, since Yerodia ceased to hold office in mid-April
2001, the issues before the court were now moot as he no longer

76. Id. ¶ 13.
77. Id. ¶ 15; Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la repression des infractions graves aux
Conventions internationales de Genéve du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8
juin 1977, additionnels à ces conventions [Law of 16 June 1993 Relative to the
Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional to These Conventions], MONITEUR BELGE
[MB] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 5, 1993, 17751 [hereinafter Law of 16 June
1993]. Article 7 of this law provides that Belgian courts hold jurisdiction over breaches
of the Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law wherever they may be
committed. See id.; see also Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 15. Article 5 of the law
stipulates that immunity stemming from an individual’s official capacity shall not
prevent application of the law. Law of 16 June 1993, supra; see also Congo v. Belgium, 2002
I.C.J. ¶ 15.
78. Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 15.
79. Id. The charged offenses were committed outside of Belgian territory. Id.
80. Id. ¶¶ 1, 32.
81. Id. ¶ 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. In particular, the Congo cited Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”).
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enjoyed immunity as Minister of Foreign Affairs.85 The ICJ,
however, ruled against Belgium’s contention, concluding that if
ICJ jurisdiction existed on the date the case was referred to the
court, such jurisdictional authority continues regardless of
subsequent events.86
Turning to the merits of the case, the court first
acknowledged that it is firmly established in international law
that certain high-ranking officers in a state, including heads of
state and ministers of foreign affairs, enjoy immunity from
criminal and civil jurisdiction in other states.87 Because there are
no conventions that speak specifically to the immunity of a
minister of foreign affairs, the court examined the immunity
provisions of other international treaties to support its decision.88
In particular, the court relied upon the preamble of the VCDR
establishing the overall purposes for diplomatic immunities and
privileges. One such purpose cited by the court included the
efficient function and performance of diplomatic missions.89
According to the court, the VCDR preamble constitutes
customary international law, a type of law the court reasons it
must use in the absence of a relevant and applicable
convention.90 In light of the similar functions of diplomats and
foreign affairs ministers and the similar need for immunity as a
result of those functions, the court found that a minister of

85. Id. ¶ 24.
86. Id. ¶ 26. Both parties agreed that there existed a legal dispute at the time of
referral of the case to the ICJ (i.e., whether Yerodia enjoyed immunity from prosecution
as a sitting minister). Id. ¶ 24. Also, both parties agreed that they were bound by their
previous consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id. ¶ 27. Belgium consented
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on June 17, 1958, and the Congo offered its
consent to such jurisdiction on February 8, 1989. Id. Additionally, the change in
Yerodia’s status may have altered part of the case but did not end the dispute, as the
Congo’s challenge was, and is, in regard to the arrest warrant. Id. ¶ 32.
87. Id. ¶ 51 (“[I]n international law it is firmly established that . . . certain holders
of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both
civil and criminal.”).
88. Id ¶ 52.
89. Id.; see Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, pmbl., Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (“[T]he purpose of such [diplomatic] privileges and
immunities is . . . to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic
missions as representing states . . . .”).
90. Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 52.
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foreign affairs should enjoy full personal immunity, or immunity
ratione personae, under customary international law.91
The ICJ next turned to examining customary international
law with regard to exceptions, or “bars,” to immunity for grave
international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against
humanity.92 The court examined state practice through
investigation into national legislation and decisions by high
national courts, finding no evidence of this type of criminal
immunity exception for ministers of foreign affairs in national
court trials.93 Additionally, the court examined the immunity
provisions in the statutes of multiple international tribunals and
again found no mention of exceptions to immunity for these
crimes in national court trials.94 Thus, the court concluded that a
sitting minister of foreign affairs, such as Yerodia, maintained
immunity from trial in a foreign national court for grave
international crimes.
Though foreign national courts may not exert jurisdiction
over sitting ministers of foreign affairs accused of grave
international crimes, the ICJ pointed out that immunity generally
does not exist under international law norms if the sitting official
is prosecuted in his or her own country, ceases to hold the office
which granted immunity at the time relevant legal proceedings
commence, is prosecuted before certain international criminal
courts or tribunals, or if the “home” state waives immunity.95 In
the case at hand, the court reasoned that, though Yerodia was no
longer the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of its
decision, the warrant was issued while he held the position and
enjoyed the immunities conferred by it.96 The court concluded
91. Id. ¶ 54. The functions of a minister of foreign affairs include diplomatic
activities, acting as a representative of a sending state, acting on behalf of a sending
state, and coordinating international relations for a state. Id. ¶ 53. A distinction cannot
be drawn between official and private acts for the purpose of immunity as arrest for
either type of act would interfere with the minister’s official functions. Id. ¶ 55.
92. Id. ¶ 60.
93. Id. ¶ 58. The court examined rulings from such courts as the English House of
Lords and French Court of Cassation. Id.
94. Id. The court examined the statutes of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY, International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, and International Military Tribunal of Tokyo. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 61. Regarding a former senior foreign official or head of state, he or she
may be tried for acts committed prior to obtaining or after leaving office, and for such
acts committed in a private capacity while in office. Id. Immunity would, however,
continue for official acts performed in office.
96. Id. ¶ 70.
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that the mere issuance of the warrant on the part of Belgium
violated its international obligations to the Congo.97 As a remedy,
the ICJ ordered Belgium to cancel its warrant and inform the
appropriate authorities of the cancellation.98
2. Charles Taylor Immunity Decision
Starting in the late 1980s, Charles Taylor served as the head
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (“NPFL”), an organized
military group.99 Taylor was elected and served as President of
the Republic of Liberia from August 2, 1997, to approximately
August 11, 2003.100 While President, Taylor worked with such
97. Id. Namely, Belgium violated its obligation to respect the Congo’s sovereignty.
Id.
98. Id. ¶ 76. Another decision regarding the immunity of heads of state and senior
officials in foreign national courts is pending before the ICJ. See Press Release 2002/37,
ICJ, The Republic of the Congo Seises the International Court of Justice of a Dispute
with France (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?pr=60&case=129. The Congo contends that France, in attempting to
prosecute a Congolese Minister of Interior in a French court for crimes against
humanity and torture allegedly committed during the execution of his official powers,
violated “the principle that a State may not, in breach of the principle of sovereign
equality among all Members of the United Nations . . . exercise its authority on the
territory of another State.” Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Criminal
Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.) 3, (Apr. 11, 2003). In addition, the Congo
contends that France, by seeking to execute a warrant for the Congolese President to
appear as a witness for police regarding the accusations against the Congolese Minister
of Interior, violated “the criminal immunity of a foreign Head of State—an international
customary rule recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court.” Id. The ICJ has issued a
decision in this case declining to issue a provisional measure to stop the French criminal
investigation of the Congolese leaders. See Request for the Indication of a Provisional
Measure, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 102, ¶¶ 4,
41. This decision still maintains the international law immunities for sitting heads of
state and senior officials established in Congo v. Belgium. See O’Donnell, supra note 3, at
413 (“A major distinction, however, is that in [Congo v. Belgium], the concern was that
any third state could execute an existing international arrest warrant against Yerodia.
For this reason, the incumbent head of state’s immunity was upheld by denying the
continued issuance of the international arrest warrant . . . . In this case, it was not the
chance that any third state would utilize a document that was already in international
circulation to draw a head of state into its courts. Instead, it was that one state had
commenced a criminal investigation into another state’s head of state. By permitting the
investigation in this case to go forward, the ICJ appears to have taken the position that
any state suspecting another state’s leader of international crimes may proceed with
investigations, even when the objective of such investigations may be to establish
liability.”); see also discussion supra note 3.
99. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second
Amended Indictment, ¶ 2 (May 29, 2007).
100. Id ¶ 3.
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groups as the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”), the RUF/AFRC Junta
or alliance, and Liberian fighters, including members and exmembers of the NPFL.101 Taylor supported, commanded, and
encouraged these groups to carry out a campaign to terrorize the
civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone.102
Charles Taylor was indicted by Stephen Rapp, the
Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, on May 29,
2007.103 By this time, it had been several years since Taylor had
resigned as President of Liberia.104 The Prosecutor charged
Taylor with eleven separate violations of international law as
provided in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone105:
(1) acts of terrorism in violation of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (i.e., “war
crimes”); (2) five counts of crimes against humanity, including
murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts, and
enslavement; (3) violence to life, health, and physical or mental
well-being of persons, including murder (Count 3) and cruel
treatment (Count 7); and (4) outrages upon personal dignity,
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into
the armed forces, and pillaging.106

101. Id. ¶ 5.
102. See id.
103. See generally id.
104. See Somini Sengupta, Liberian President Resigns as Peacekeepers Enter Capital, N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
8,
2003,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
940CE6DC1431F93BA3575BC0A9659C8B63&pagewanted=1.
105. Taylor was charged pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 of the Statute.
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Statute provides: “A person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime referred to in . . . the present Statute shall be individually
responsible for the crime.” Agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
art. 6, para. 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 provides:
The fact that any of the [criminal] acts referred to in . . . the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of
criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior
had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 3.
106. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second
Amended Indictment, ¶ 2 (May 29, 2007). Regarding terrorizing the civilian population:
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“Members of the RUF, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC),
RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, were assisted and
encouraged by, acted in concert with, under the direction and/or control of,
and/or subordinate to [Taylor], burned civilian property . . . as part of a
campaign to terrorize the civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone.
Id. ¶ 5.
In regard to murder:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], throughout Sierra Leone,
unlawfully killed an unknown number of civilians . . . .
Id. ¶ 9.
In regard to rape and sexual slavery:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], committed widespread
acts of violence against civilian women and girls . . . .
Id. ¶ 14.
In regard to other inhumane acts:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], committed widespread
acts of physical violence against citizens . . . .
Id. ¶ 18.
In regard to enslavement:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], engaged in widespread
and large scale abductions of civilians and use of civilians as forced labour . . . .
Id. ¶ 23.
In regard to conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into the
armed forces:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], routinely conscripted,
enlisted and/or used boys and girls under the age of 15 to participate in active
hostilities. Many of these children were first abducted then trained in AFRC
and/or RUF camps in various locations throughout the country, and
thereafter used as fighters.
Id. ¶ 22.
In regard to pillaging:
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], engaged in widespread
unlawful taking of civilian property . . . .
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On July 23, 2003, Taylor’s counsel filed a motion to quash
the indictment and declare void the arrest warrant on the basis of
head-of-state immunity.107 On May 31, 2004, the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone denied Taylor’s
motion.108 It pointed out that Article 6 of the Special Court’s
governing statute stipulates that the official position of an
accused does not remove individual criminal responsibility.109
According to the Appeals Chamber, the International Law
Commission had accepted this restriction on immunity as long
ago as 1950 during the formation of the Charter for the
Nuremberg Tribunal.110 Furthermore, the stripping of immunity
before international judicial bodies for heads of state and other
government officials has become well established since 1950, as
evidenced by the governing statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the ICC.111 Finally, to further
support its denial of Taylor’s motion for immunity from
indictment and arrest, the Appeals Chamber considered the
reasoning of the ICJ’s decision in Congo v. Belgium.112 Based upon
the ICJ’s reasoning in that case, the Chamber concluded that
head-of-state prosecutions by international judicial bodies are
acceptable.113 International judicial bodies are created by the
authority of the international community as a whole, and thus do
not infringe on the principles of sovereignty when passing
judgment on heads of state and other high officials.114
Id. ¶ 28.
107. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, 2 (May 31, 2004).
108. Id. ¶ 60.
109. Id. ¶ 44.
110. Id. ¶ 47.
111. Id. ¶ 45. The court also noted the decreased risk to international peace and
stability posed by an international trial of a sitting head of state compared to a foreign
national trial: “[S]tates have considered the collective judgment of the international
community to provide a vital safeguard against the potential destabilizing effect of
unilateral [foreign national court] judgment in this area.” Id. ¶ 51 (quoting Professor
Diane Orentlicher’s amicus brief).
112. Id. ¶ 50; see supra Part II.A.1.
113. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, ¶ 52.
114. Id. Charles Taylor’s trial is still ongoing by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Due to security concerns with trying Taylor at the court’s headquarters in Sierra Leone,
the court is using facilities in The Hague for Taylor’s trial. The Prosecutor vs. Charles
Ghankay Taylor, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/
ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
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International Codification and the Developing ICC Case Against
Sudanese President Al-Bashir

As explicitly mentioned in the Congo v. Belgium decision,
international criminal courts, in direct contrast to national courts
under international law, maintain the authority to prosecute
sitting heads of state and government officials for grave crimes.115
For example, the statutes of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY, and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone decline to recognize immunity for
grave crimes committed by heads of state and other
governmental officials.116 The ICC recently charged the current
head of state of Sudan, President Al-Bashir, with grave
international crimes, including crimes against humanity, war
crimes and, most recently over the summer of 2010, genocide.
Thus the ICC has now issued two separate warrants for AlBashir’s arrest.117

According to the court’s website, “The Special Court trial of Charles Ghankay Taylor is
taking place at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) courtroom in Leidschendam,
the Netherlands.” Id.
115. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶
61 (Feb. 14).
116. Id. For a detailed explanation of the immunity provisions codified in the
statutes of these respective international tribunals, see infra note 184.
117. The ICC Prosecutor charged President Al-Bashir, the current head of state of
Sudan, with grave international crimes, including crimes against humanity and war
crimes, for his role as an indirect perpetrator and coconspirator of these crimes. The
Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for Al-Bashir’s arrest. See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir,
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009). The prosecutor charged
Al-Bashir with the following war crimes: pillaging and intentionally directing attacks
against civilians. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. The prosecutor charged Al-Bashir with the following crimes
against humanity: murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape. Id. ¶¶ 7–
8. In the summer of 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a second arrest warrant for AlBashir for the crime of genocide. Al-Bashir is charged with three counts of genocide. See
Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12,
2010). Significantly, the Chamber found the necessary genocidal intent to charge alBashir with genocide. See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 5–6 (July 12, 2010).
In the Sudan, government military and police forces as well as local militias such as the
Janjaweed, who are armed and often commanded by the government, have burned and
looted rebel villages, raped women, killed people, and forced survivors to flee to Chad.
John Ryle, Disaster in Darfur, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 55. The Sudanese
government has undertaken these violent actions in response to demands from rebel
groups in the Darfur region of the Sudan for greater representation. Id.
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III. HEAD OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY:
FOREIGN NATIONAL APPROACHES
A. United Kingdom: The Case against Augusto Pinochet
Augusto Pinochet led a coup d’etat against Chilean
President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973 to claim the
presidency.118 While Pinochet was in office, barbaric acts were
committed within Chile, including torture, murder, and the
unexplained disappearance of individuals en masse.119 Pinochet
apparently instigated and had knowledge of these crimes.120 On
October 16, 1998, Spain issued an international arrest warrant
for Pinochet while the former president was in England receiving
medical treatment.121 This action, in turn, led a London
magistrate to issue a provisional warrant for Pinochet under the
Extradition Act of 1989.122 Pinochet was arrested on October 17,
1998 in a London hospital.123 Following Pinochet’s arrest, Spain
issued a second warrant on October 18, which charged Pinochet
with five offenses, and an English magistrate issued a second
provisional warrant on October 22.124

118. R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte)
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190 (appeal taken from Divisional Court of the
Queen’s Bench).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 191.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The English magistrate warrant of October 22, 1998 reads:
(1) Between 1 January 1988 and December 1992 being a public official
intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering on another in the performance
or purported performance of his official duties; (2) between 1 January 1988
and 31 December 1992 being a public official, conspired with persons
unknown to intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering on another in the
performance or purported performance of his official duties; (3) between 1
January 1982 and 31 January 1992 he detained other persons (the hostages)
and in order to compel such persons to do or to abstain from doing any act
threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain the hostages; (4) between 1
January 1982 and 31 January 1992 conspired with persons unknown to detain
other persons (the hostages) and in order to compel such persons to do or to
abstain from doing any act, threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain the
hostages;(5) between January 1976 and December 1992 conspired together
with persons unknown to commit murder in a Convention country.
Id.
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In response, Pinochet’s counsel filed habeas corpus
petitions challenging both provisional warrants.125 On October
28, 1998, the divisional court in England quashed both
warrants.126 The second warrant was quashed on the grounds that
Pinochet enjoyed immunity as a former head of state and that
certain alleged offenses were non-extradition crimes under the
Extradition Act of 1989.127
The Crown Prosecution Service, on behalf of the
Government of Spain, appealed the divisional court’s ruling to
the Lords of Appeal.128 Before the appeal was heard, Spain issued
a formal Request for Extradition on November 4, 1998,
expanding the list of alleged offenses.129 The appeal was first
heard by the Lords between November 4 and 12, 1998, resulting
in a judgment on November 25 denying Pinochet immunity for
crimes under international law.130 This judgment, however, was
set aside on January 15, 1999 on the grounds that the Committee
of Lords that rendered the decision was improperly
constituted.131
Following the setting aside of the initial judgment, another
appeal was filed in the House of Lords on January 18, 1999.132
Before this appeal was heard, however, British Home Secretary
Jack Straw ordered a magistrate judge to authorize extradition
proceedings under the Extradition Act of 1989 for all charges
except genocide.133 Additionally, the Republic of Chile, which
argued for Pinochet’s immunity, was added as a party to the
litigation.134 Chile also sought to alter the charges against
Pinochet.135
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Certain offenses were deemed to be nonextraditable as they were not
crimes in England on the date they were alleged to have been committed. Id.
128. Id. The point of law on appeal was “the proper interpretation and scope of the
immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in
the United Kingdom with respect to acts committed while he was head of state.” Id.
129. Id. at 191–92.
130. Id. at 192.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Straw relied in part on the previous decision of the House of Lords, finding
that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity in issuing authorization to the magistrate to
proceed. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Chile sought to alter the charges as follows:
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Concerning the appeal to the House of Lords, Lord BrowneWilkinson analyzed both the nature of the charged offenses and
the status of former-head-of-state immunity to determine if
Pinochet could indeed be extradited to Spain.136 According to
Wilkinson, any crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet that were
not crimes under English law at the time of their commission
cannot be considered extraditable.137 The Extradition Act 1989
requires extraditable offenses to have dual-criminality, meaning
the acts must be crimes both in England and in the location
where the acts were committed.138 This meant that Pinochet

Charges 1, 2 and 5: conspiracy to torture between 1 January 1972 and 20
September 1973 and between 1 August 1973 and 1 January 1990;
Charge 3: conspiracy to take hostages between 1 August 1973 and 1 January
1990;
Charge 4: conspiracy to torture in furtherance of which murder was
committed in various countries including Italy, France, Spain and Portugal,
between 1 January 1972 and 1 January 1990;
Charges 6 and 8: torture between 1 August 1973 and 8 August 1973 and on 11
September 1973;
Charges 9 and 12: conspiracy to murder in Spain between 1 January 1975 and
31 December 1976 and in Italy on 6 October 1975;
Charges 10 and 11: attempted murder in Italy on 6 October 1975;
Charges 13–29; and 31–32: torture on various occasions between 11 September
1973 and May 1977;
Charge 30: torture on 24 June 1989.
Id. at 192–93.
136. Id. at 193.
137. Id.
138. Id. The provisions of the Extradition Act 1989 are as follows:
(1) In this Act, except in Schedule 1, 'extradition crime' means—
(a) conduct in the territory of a foreign state, a designated Commonwealth
country or a colony which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would
constitute an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months,
or any greater punishment, and which, however described in the law of the
foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony, is so punishable under that
law;
(b) an extraterritorial offence against the law of a foreign state, designated
Commonwealth country or colony which is punishable under that law with
imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment, and which
satisfies—
(i) the condition specified in subsection (2) below; or
(ii) all the conditions specified in subsection (3) below.
(2) The condition mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i) above is that in
corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute an
extraterritorial offence against the law of the United Kingdom punishable with
imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment.
(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(ii) above are—
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could not be extradited for alleged offenses related to torture
that occurred before September 29, 1988, which was the date the
United Kingdom ratified the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“Torture Convention” or “Convention”); however, alleged acts
of torture and conspiracy to commit torture committed by
Pinochet after September 29, 1988, remained extraditable
offenses.139
For the Torture Convention and related torture provisions
in English law to apply, Pinochet must be considered either a
public official or a person acting in an official capacity.140 Both
Pinochet and representatives of Chile conceded that, should the
alleged acts be proved, they were carried out by a public official
or person acting in an official capacity.141 Agreeing with this
concession, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that a finding that
a head of state such as Pinochet was not a public official would
result in no person being guilty under the Torture Convention.142
(a) that the foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony bases its
jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender;
(b) that the conduct constituting the offence occurred outside the United
Kingdom; and
(c) that, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would constitute an
offence under the law of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment
for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment.”
Extradition Act, 1989, c. 33 § 2 (Eng.).
139. R v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) (No.3),
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 197 (appeal taken from Divisional Court of the Queen’s
Bench). Note that charges of alleged hostage-taking were also non-extraditable as they
were not offenses under the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982. Id. With regard to the
revised charges, only charge 9 and parts of charges 2, 4, and 30 committed prior to
September 29, 1988, were extraditable. Id.
140. Id. at 199 (“Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as the intentional
infliction of severe pain and of suffering with a view to achieving a wide range of
purposes ‘when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.’”); see also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-22,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Similarly, Section 134 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1988
requires that acts of torture be carried out by or with the instigation or consent of a
public official or person acting in an official capacity. Id. at 231; see also Criminal Justice
Act, 1988, c. 33 § 134 (“A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever
his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he
intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or
purported performance of his official duties.”).
141. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 200.
142. Id.
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Such a finding would be problematic because Chile, Spain, and
the United Kingdom, as state parties to the Convention, are
obligated either to prosecute or extradite Convention violators.143
Lastly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson examined the extent of
Pinochet’s immunity as a former head of state.144 A basic
principle of international law holds that one sovereign shall not
adjudicate the conduct of another.145 The immunity from foreign
state jurisdiction extends to sitting heads of state and
ambassadors, rendering them immune from all judicial actions
or prosecutions by foreign states.146 The immunities enjoyed by
sitting heads of state and ambassadors are complete with regard
to both civil and criminal offenses and are attached to the
officials themselves.147 Former heads of state retain a limited
amount of immunity for official acts carried out while in office.148
Pinochet, as a former Chilean head of state, enjoys
immunity in relation to official acts performed while in office.149
Lord Brown-Wilkinson, however, found strong evidence to
suggest that Pinochet’s immunity does not protect him from
prosecution under the Torture Convention.150 According to
Wilkinson, individual criminal responsibility for those who violate
international law is well established.151 In particular, Lord BrownWilkinson doubted that even before the establishment of the
Torture Convention, torture could be considered an official state
function.152 Actions such as torture which are universally
prohibited by international law cannot be considered official
functions.153 Additionally, an essential element of torture under
143. Id. at 199.
144. Id. at 201–05.
145. Id. at 201.
146. Id.
147. Id. Immunity which attaches to the officials themselves regardless of the
nature of their actions is known as immunity ratione personae. Id. at 202.
148. Id. Immunity which attaches only to the official acts of an official is referred to
as immunity ratione materiae. Id. Lord Brown-Wilkinson found that heads of state lose
their immunity ratione personae, or personal immunity, when leaving office. Id. (citing
Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Government
and Foreign Ministers, 247 Receuil des Cours 9, 88 (1994)).
149. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 202–03 (appeal
taken from Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 204 (citing the reasoning of Watts, supra note 148).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 205.

2011] HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY AFTER SAMANTAR

365

the Torture Convention is that it be carried out by or under the
order of a public official.154 If Pinochet had organized and
authorized torture after the enactment of the Torture
Convention in the United Kingdom, he was not acting in any
capacity that triggered immunity. Thus, Pinochet, as a former
head of state, could be extradited for acts of torture and
conspiracy to commit torture he allegedly committed after
September 29, 1988 (the United Kingdom’s date of ratification of
the Convention).155
In March 1999, the House of Lords upheld the validity of
Spain’s warrant and ordered Pinochet’s extradition.156 British
Home Secretary Straw, however, doubted Pinochet’s ability to
stand trial. Indeed, on January 11, 2000, Straw informed
Pinochet’s counsel and those representing Spain that he had
ordered a medical examination to discern Pinochet’s
competency to stand trial.157 The first indication of his failing
health was on October 6, 1999, when the Bow Street Magistrate
excused him from appearing at the judgment stage of the trial.158
Following this incident, Straw received information from the
Chilean Embassy on October 14 indicating a significant
deterioration in Pinochet’s health.159 Based on the excusal from
proceedings and the report filed by the Chilean Embassy, Straw
invited Pinochet to submit to a medical examination, to which he
consented.160 On January 11 and 12, Straw announced that the
154. Id.
155. Id. However, Lord Brown-Wilkinson found no reason Pinochet should not
enjoy immunity with regard to the crimes of murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
See id; see also LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 775 (2d ed. 2009) (“Lord BrownWilkinson accepted that torture was a jus cogens crime. But he also concluded that the
British courts exercise jurisdiction over [Pinochet for the purpose of ordering his
extradition to Spain to face the relevant charges] only for tortuous acts occurring after
the coming into force of the Torture Convention for Chile, Spain and the United
Kingdom.”).
156. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 205.
157. 2 Mar. 2000, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2000) 358W–371W (U.K.), ¶ 5, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000302/
text/00302w09.htm#00302w09.html_spnew3 [hereinafter Straw Extradition Statement].
158. Id. ¶ 9. Pinochet was excused from attendance based on evidence produced by
the general practitioner who attended the senator. Id.
159. Id. ¶ 10.
160. Id. An independent medical team was formed to obtain an independent
report of relevant clinical facts. Id. The team consisted of Sir John Grimley Evans and
Dr. Michael Denham, geriatric specialists; Professor Andrew Lees, specialist in
movement disorders and dementia; and Dr. Maria Wyke, neuropsychologist. Id. These
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medical reports indicated that Pinochet was unfit to stand trial.161
In his opinion, trying Pinochet would be a violation of Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to a
fair trial).162
B.

Spain and Germany

In the aftermath of the ground-breaking Pinochet decision,
countries such as Spain and Germany began to take a more
aggressive stance towards the prosecution of former heads of
state and senior foreign officials under universal jurisdiction
principles. For example, under Spain’s universal jurisdiction
criminal statute, its courts have entertained lawsuits against a
former Chinese head of state for genocide in Tibet, Guatemalan
generals for various international crimes against the Mayan
people, and actually convicted a former Argentine military
officer for his commission of crimes against humanity in
Argentina.163 Notably, Spain places certain limitations upon its
exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction, including a bar of
prosecution on sitting heads of state and senior governmental
officials.164 In addition, Spanish courts will defer to criminal
examiners were asked to evaluate Pinochet specifically with regard to his ability to follow
questioning, recall events, and give coherent evidence. Id. ¶ 11. The examination took
place over a period of six hours on January 5, 2000 at Northwick Park hospital in
London. Id. ¶ 13.
161. Id. ¶ 14. The medical examiners were convinced that Pinochet was not faking
his disability nor was it likely to improve significantly. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 20. In June 2000, a Chilean court stripped Pinochet of immunity from
prosecution; the Supreme Court of Chile upheld the decision in August 2000. Timeline:
The Pinochet Legal Saga, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1209914.stm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2010). In August 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the
lower court decision. Id.
163. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 776; see also Ley Orgánica del Poder
Judicial [Organic Law of Judicial Power] art. 23(4) (B.O.E. 1985, 157 (Spain). For a
translation of Article 23(4) of Spain’s Organic Law of Judicial Power, see LUC REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 183
(2003) (“Spanish courts have jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by Spaniards and
foreigners, if these acts constitute any of the following offenses under Spanish law: (a)
genocide; (b) terrorism; (c) sea or air piracy; (d) counterfeiting; (e) offenses in
connection with prostitution and corruption of minors and incompetents; (f) drug
trafficking; [and] (g) any other offense which Spain is obliged to prosecute under an
international treaty or Convention.”).
164. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155at 777 (citing Mugambi Jouet, Spain’s Expanded
Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights Abuses in Latin America, China and Beyond,
35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 495, 497, 511–13 (2007)).
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prosecutions by international tribunals.165 Finally, under the
subsidiarity principle, Spanish courts must generally defer to ongoing or impending foreign national prosecutions in the
territorial state of the crime; however, “they need not defer to
such proceedings when ‘serious and reasonable proofs of judicial
inactivity [demonstrate] a fault, whether of will or of capacity, to
effectively prosecute the crimes.’”166
Similarly, German courts have the authority to exercise
universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes with no
actual connection to that nation. In fact, “the German Code of
Crimes Against International Law, enacted on June 30, 2002,
creates universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.”167 The German prosecutor has wide
discretion under this statute to commence a criminal
proceeding; however, there are certain factors that limit this
discretion:
The German federal prosecutor will only exercise universal
jurisdiction if the competent authorities of the territorial
state, or of the state of nationality of the suspect or victim,
refrain from carrying out a genuine investigation and where
the International Criminal Court or another competent
international tribunal does not investigate the case.168

Notably, the German prosecutor applied these limiting
factors, which together form the “subsidiarity” principle, in a
case brought by Iraqi nationals against former US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other US military officials for
alleged torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.169 As a result of
his application of the subsidiarity principle, the German
prosecutor chose not to proceed against the US officials:
[T]he prosecutor argued that the crimes referred to in the
complaint (war crimes against persons and grievous bodily
harm), were already under investigation by US authorities
and therefore the principle of subsidiarity would not permit
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Jouet, supra note 164, at 511–13). Another limitation concerning
the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spanish courts is that “defendants may not be
tried in absentia.” Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE
STATE OF THE ART 65 (2006)). This is the “subsidiarity” principle.
169. Id.
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German authorities to investigate the complaint. According
to the prosecutor’s argument, the principle of subsidiarity
does not permit national authorities to take into account
whether national authorities are investigating the individual
referred to in the complaint but rather whether the US
authorities were investigating the complex as a whole.170

IV. ANALYSIS
The doctrines of foreign head-of-state immunity and foreign
official immunity in the United States are in a state of disarray. In
light of the overall dearth of precedent cases in the head-of-state
context, it is exceedingly difficult to predict an outcome in any
current case, particularly when the US Executive Branch declines
to make an immunity recommendation. Regarding official
immunity, Samantar appears to have removed the increased
precision and certainty of outcome that the FSIA offered for the
foreign official immunity inquiry. After Samantar, similar to the
head-of-state immunity inquiry, foreign official immunity will be
evaluated under the more nebulous common-law standards.171 In
addition, Samantar may increase the likelihood of suits against
foreign government officials by removing FSIA’s protective cloak
of immunity. Thus, what is needed is a clear set of criteria, or
guidelines, for US courts to use when confronted with an
immunity claim by a foreign head of state or foreign
governmental official. Such criteria could be fashioned by either
US courts through the development of common-law precedent
or through the legislative codification process in Congress.
Rather conveniently, evolving jurisprudence on immunity
for foreign heads of state and officials may provide a basis for
formulating US domestic guidelines in this area. For example,
under international law, sitting heads of state and senior officials
enjoy full immunity before foreign national courts for conduct
performed while in office.172 In the absence of guidance from the

170. Id. at 777–78 (emphasis in original).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 42–62 (discussing this common law analysis
used in the head-of-state immunity context, including the independent determination
made by courts in the absence of executive-branch guidance).
172. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 21–22 (Feb. 14).
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executive branch,173 US courts could draw upon the ICJ
precedent in Congo v. Belgium, which generally allows full
personal immunity from prosecution, or immunity ratione
personae, to sitting heads of state and other high-ranking foreign
officials under customary international law.174 Such reliance
would conform to US executive branch practice because the
branch has generally recommended immunity for sitting heads
of state who are recognized as the official leaders of their
country.175 In addition, this approach conforms to the spirit if not
the letter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which states that heads of state are
accorded immunity from suit for actions performed during
official visits to foreign countries.176 This reliance also seems
appropriate because ICJ decisions, such as Congo v. Belgium,
though only formally binding on the parties to a particular
dispute, constitute respected sources of international law. As a
173. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47 (discussing US judicial reliance on
executive branch guidance in the context of head-of-state immunity); supra text
accompanying notes 49–56 (discussing US court cases involving instances when
executive branch guidance was lacking); see also supra text accompanying note 59.
174. See Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at 22, 25 (noting that this immunity applies in
foreign national trials of sitting heads of state and other senior officials, meaning that it
does not apply in international tribunals with jurisdiction or in the courts of the head of
state’s home country). The Congo v. Belgium decision focused primarily on immunity
from criminal prosecution for sitting heads of state and officials in the courts of foreign
nations. For a case holding that these individuals also enjoy immunity from civil suits for
damages in foreign national courts, see Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka AlArabiya AS Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), [2006] UKHL 26 (2006), [2007] 1
A.C. 270 (appeal taken from Eng.). In addition to the Congo v. Belgium decision, US
courts could rely upon the Charles Taylor Immunity Decision, discussed supra, Part
II.A.2.
175. See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004); Tachiona v. Mugabe,
169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139–40
(E.D.N.Y, 1994). In contrast, when a head of state is not the recognized constitutional
leader, has left office, or has had his immunity waived by his home state, the executive
branch has generally declined to suggest immunity. See, e.g., Estate of Domingo v.
Republic of the Phillippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (executive branch
did not suggest immunity for former head of state Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210–11, (S.D. Fl. 1992) (executive branch
did not suggest immunity in context of waiver); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
1506, 1518–19 (S.D. Fl. 1990) (executive branch did not suggest immunity for
constitutionally unrecognized leader). Note that the Philippine government had also
waived Marcos’s immunity. See In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1988).
176. See infra note 178. Notably, the Restatement’s concept of immunity for heads
of state is technically more limited in nature (e.g., immunity for actions performed while
on official visits abroad).
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corollary, the ICJ pronouncement in Congo v. Belgium that the
norm implicating head-of-state immunity stems from customary
international law means that the United States is generally
obligated to follow that norm.177 Finally, providing full immunity
to sitting heads of state, particularly those making official foreign
visits, aligns nicely with long-standing policy goals such as
promoting friendly relations, peace, and international security
among states.178
While there is a strong argument to be made that under
international law, US courts should refrain from prosecuting a
foreign sitting head of state even in the absence of an executive
branch suggestion of immunity, a US court contemplating such a
prosecution should first consider a range of circumstances and
factors prior to proceeding. For example, a court could consider
whether the foreign state made any formal or informal gesture to
waive their leader’s immunity.179 Such a waiver would serve as
strong evidence that the foreign state had no objection—or
177. The binding nature of ICJ judgments on the parties to a particular case is
expressed in Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, arts. 38(1)(b), 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, (demonstrating that
customary international law is binding on nations by defining international customary
law as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law” and expressing the binding
nature of ICJ judgments on the parties to a particular case); see also Steven Koh,
Respectful Consideration after Sanchez-Llamas: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the
International Court of Justice, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 265–73 (2007) (arguing that US
courts, particularly the US Supreme Court, should give more weight to ICJ decisions:
“As legal systems continue to integrate in a globalizing world, US courts will increasingly
face divergent domestic and international obligations. Though the International Court
of Justice does not assert any formal authority over the US Supreme Court, its mounting
influence over a variety of international legal matters should cause the Court to heavily
weigh the ICJ's decisions.”); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 193 (“In essence,
international custom . . . is comprised of rules that states implicitly accept as legally
binding through their conduct.”).
178. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ¶¶ 2, 4, Apr. 24, 1963, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 (mentioning these policy goals in the context of visiting foreign consuls);
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464 (“When a head of state or government comes
on an official visit to another country, he is generally given the same personal
inviolability and immunities as are accorded to members of special missions, essentially
those of an accredited diplomat.”) Under the VCDR, diplomatic agents are immune
from the jurisdiction of any receiving state. This immunity extends to criminal, civil, and
administrative jurisdiction. VCDR, supra note 89, art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95. These standards for diplomatic relations were created to recognize the
status of diplomatic agents and reinforce international equality, peace, and security. Id.
pmbl.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63 (discussing the waiver issue in the
head-of-state context).
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consented—to US courts exercising jurisdiction over its leader.
In addition, a court may evaluate whether the US government
recognized the putative head of state as the official leader of the
country.180 A denial of such recognition would suggest that the
US executive branch does not seek immunity in the particular
case and perhaps more importantly, that the “leader” is not
entitled to immunity as a legitimate head of state. Another factor
that courts may consider is the nature of the acts committed by
the head of state. For example, purely private, commercial acts
could be viewed as not triggering immunity while official acts
would be entitled to immunity.181 Thus, when a head of state
commits an illegal act as part of a personal business venture (e.g.,

180. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59 (discussing the factor of formal
recognition of a foreign leader by the US government).
181. The private versus public nature of acts is an analytical criterion that is also
used in the former-head-of-state context. See, e.g., supra notes 63–66 and accompanying
text (US law); supra notes 91, 144, and accompanying text (international law). Note that
the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium rejected any exception to immunity under customary
international law for sitting heads of state and senior officials for certain, potentially
“private” activity committed while in office, namely war crimes or crimes against
humanity (e.g., international crimes). See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). Thus, US courts contemplating using the
public-private distinction to evaluate immunity for a sitting head of state must give “due
regard” to this pronouncement regarding customary law by the ICJ; however, using or
applying this distinction is not necessarily in violation of customary law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97–98
(June 27) (“If a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the
rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.”); see also
Mallory, Resolving the Confusion, supra note 3, at 190–93 (arguing that, similar to the FSIA
exceptions in the context of foreign sovereign immunity, in the context of head-of-state
immunity there should be immunity exceptions in cases of waiver, commercial activity,
certain kinds of property (e.g., expropriated property gifts, inheritances and moveable
property), and for certain non-commercial torts that cause injury or death in the United
States). For the actual text pertaining to these FSIA provisions, see supra notes 34–42
and accompanying text. Mallory also argues that the person of a head of state should be
inviolable; therefore, like diplomats, heads of state should not be subject to arrest or
detention when on official, foreign visits. Because Mallory argues for freeing heads of
state completely from the criminal jurisdiction of the United States and for the
inviolability of the head of state’s person (i.e., from arrest or detention), his argument
for maintaining head-of-state liability in criminal cases requires that civil tort liability be
“appended to criminal acts.” Id. at 193–96. Successful plaintiffs in such a tort suit would
be awarded monetary damages (e.g., as opposed to a jail sentence for the defendant). Id.
at 195–96.
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drug trafficking), immunity would not apply.182 “Ordinary” type
crimes such as murder or theft not connected with official, statesanctioned policies (e.g., legitimate military action, a duly
authorized court sentence, etc.) could also be considered
“private” acts. Conversely, decisions related to the
implementation of state policy by the head of state, such as those
touching upon the economy, health care, the environment, or
foreign relations would be immune from the jurisdiction of US
courts.183
In addition, if the foreign head of state has committed a
grave crime in violation of international law norms, US courts
should consider deferring to any ongoing or pending
investigation by an international prosecuting body that has
jurisdiction. For example, the ICC was created for the express
purpose of prosecuting serious international crimes such as
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and can
exercise its jurisdiction to try such crimes in a variety of instances,
including exercising jurisdiction over sitting heads of state.184
182. For example, the Court in Noriega viewed drug trafficking for personal
monetary gain to be an unofficial, private act. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d
1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
183. For a detailed discussion of how crimes “fit” into the public versus private
dichotomy, see infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text, addressing the former headof-state issue.
184. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ acknowledged that even sitting heads of state (and
other senior officials) can be tried by international tribunals such as the ICC. See Congo
v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at 25. For the idea that the ICC is focused on grave international
crimes, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For a list of the qualifying crimes over which
the ICC has substantive jurisdiction, see id. art. 5, ¶ 1. These crimes (e.g., genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes) are defined more specifically in Articles 6 to 8
of the Rome Statute. For the situations in which the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction
over qualifying crimes, see id. art. 12 (explaining that the court may exercise its
jurisdiction over crimes occurring on the territory of state parties to the Rome Statute or
if the person accused of a crime is a national of one of the state parties) and art. 13
(explaining that situations, or cases, may be referred to the ICC by a state party, by the
UN Security Council—in which case the Article 12 requirements are inapplicable—or as
a result of the prosecutor’s own investigations). The ICC can prosecute sitting (or
former) heads of state and other governmental officials. See id. art. 27, ¶ 1 (“Th[e
Rome] Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”); see also supra note 117
(discussing the ICC’s indictment of President Al-Bashir of Sudan). The statutes of other
international criminal tribunals, including the ICTR, ICTY, and the Special Court for
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Though US courts formally have jurisdiction over certain grave
international crimes such as genocide and war crimes, and
although the United States is not yet a state party to the ICC,185
strong conceptual and policy-oriented reasons point in the
direction of deference to an international body that has
jurisdiction, such as the ICC. For example, subjecting a current
foreign leader to US criminal jurisdiction represents a significant
Sierra Leone, all contain similar provisions to the ICC provision prohibiting immunity
for heads of state and other officials. See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, supra note 105, at art. 6, para. 2 (“The official position of accused as head of
state or government official does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate
punishment.”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1598 (“The official position of accused as head of state or government official
does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate punishment.”); Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, para. 2, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1159 (“The official position of accused as head of state or government official
does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate punishment.”). Former President
of Liberia Charles Taylor was denied any immunity for his crimes, including crimes
against humanity and war crimes, before the Special Court of Sierra Leone despite
having committed them while in office. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004). The former Prime Minister
of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was tried and convicted before the ICTR for genocide and
crimes against humanity, see Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-DP,
Indictment, at 6–7 (Oct. 16, 1997), and received a life sentence. See ICTR 97-23-S,
Judgment and Sentence, 28 (Sept. 4, 1998). Finally, the President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”), Slobodan Milošević, was indicted before the ICTY for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment (June 29, 2001). Milošević died before his
trial could be completed before the ICTY. See Key Figures, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/
sections/TheCases/KeyFigures#concpros (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
185. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009) (criminalizing, under US law, the
international crime of genocide); id. § 2441 (2006) (criminalizing war crimes under US
law). For a further discussion of these domestic statutes, see CARTER ET AL., supra note
28, at 1160–79. There are treaty obligations on the part of the US to punish certain
international crimes. For example, the United States, a state party to the Genocide
Convention, must punish criminal acts of genocide either in its domestic courts—
provided the acts were committed on US territory—or “by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those [states] which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, arts. 5–6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Thus, in the case of genocide, these
international obligations would be satisfied by deferring to a prosecution of a head of
state by an international tribunal. In the case of deference to the ICC, the United States,
not a formal member of the court, could make an ad hoc agreement with the court to
accept its jurisdiction in the particular case. See Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 87, ¶¶
5(a)–(b). Of course, if the international forum made no effort to proceed against the
foreign leader, there would be no forum to which US courts might defer. For a
discussion of legislation that the US Congress passed to implement obligations under
the Genocide Convention, including a discussion of the Genocide Accountability Act of
2007, see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 979.
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affront to the sovereignty of the foreign nation, likely greater
than any affront posed by an international court.186 Perhaps most
importantly, the trial of a sitting head of state in the United
States is likely to have substantial and primarily negative foreign
policy implications for the United States. In most instances, the
state whose current leader is being prosecuted will not view
favorably such a maneuver by US courts. In addition, trying
foreign leaders in US courts may have a chilling effect on the
frequency of visits by foreign leaders to US soil or on productive
interaction in general between these foreign leaders and their
US counterparts. Furthermore, US courts aggressively exercising
their jurisdiction over heads of state for international crimes may
attract retaliatory actions by foreign states in the form of
potentially frivolous lawsuits against US leaders in foreign courts.
Finally, international trials of heads of state, though certainly not
free of stability concerns,187 would seem to pose a lesser threat to
international peace than “third party” national prosecutions.
Moreover, deference by US courts in the head-of-state
context to an on-going or pending international prosecution or
to certain, legitimate foreign national prosecutions aligns nicely
with the principle of complementarity inherent within the ICC
system and with the principle of subsidiarity present in an
increasing number of national jurisdictions.188 For example,
186. The international forum draws its authority from the consensus and consent
of multiple nations; indeed, in the case of the ICC, 113 countries are already parties to
it. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/
states+parties (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
187. The warrant issued by the ICC for President Al-Bashir of the Sudan has
attracted criticism, in part for its ability to further destabilize an already dire and
precarious human rights situation in Sudan. For a description of the warrant issued by
the ICC for Al-Bashir, see supra note 117. For a description of the human rights situation
in Sudan, see Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an Integrated Approach
to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur—The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement and Related
Issues in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069 (2008).
For criticism of the consequences of the ICC executing this warrant and proceeding with
the prosecution of Al-Bashir, see Roza Pati, The ICC and the Case of Sudan’s Omar Al
Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a Valid Option?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 324
(2009) (“[T]he concern that Sudan, the largest nation in the African Continent, might
risk partition, augmented by the fear of the collapse of a fragile peace process, creates a
situation where a potential plea-bargain should be an option under consideration
[instead of a full trial against al-Bashir].”).
188. For example, both Germany and Spain have applied the principle of
subsidiarity in their criminal prosecutions of foreign officials. See HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 155, at 777 (explaining that because US authorities were investigating the matter,
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under the concept of subsidiarity, US courts would defer to the
courts of the territorial state in which the crime occurred (or the
state of which the victim or suspect is a citizen) provided that
those courts are both able and willing to carry out a fair,
impartial trial of the head of state. Alignment with this emerging
concept of subsidiarity will help to foster greater esteem for the
United States in its foreign relations as this approach respects the
sovereignty of foreign states. It also helps ensure that the United
States will receive similar treatment when suits are contemplated
abroad against its leaders (e.g., foreign nations will likewise be
more inclined to defer to an on-going or impending US trial of
the head of state, assuming the alleged crime occurred in the
United States, the victim or the suspect is a US citizen, or there is
a similarly strong US link to the crime in question).
Notably, a call for deference by US courts to an on-going or
pending international criminal prosecution of a foreign head of
state fits within the spirit of the ICC’s complementarity principle,
if not the letter.189 Such a call may perhaps best be termed
the German prosecutor applied the principle of subsidiarity in an action brought by
Iraqi nationals against US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield and others for alleged
abusive treatment they suffered at the hands of US military personnel at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq). Notably, for the German subsidiarity principle to apply, an investigation
by the ICC or a “genuine” investigation by competent authorities of the territorial state
of the crime (or of the state of nationality of the victim or suspect) is all that is required.
See id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 168). The German universal criminal
jurisdiction statute allows for prosecution of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. See id.; see also Strafgesezbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998,
Bundesgesetzblatt, TEIL I at 3322 § 6 (Ger.). Similarly, Spain has placed certain
limitations on its own exercise of universal jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad by
foreigners:
[T]he [Spanish] Constitutional Tribunal has held that Spanish courts must
give priority to prosecutions in the territorial state if proceedings there have
already been or will soon be initiated. But they need not defer to such
proceedings when “serious and reasonable proofs of judicial inactivity
[demonstrate] a fault, whether of will or of capacity, to effectively prosecute
the crimes.”
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (citing Jouet, supra note 164, at 511–13). In
addition, Spanish jurisprudence indicates that Spain will also defer to international
criminal prosecutions. Id. Finally, Spain does not permit trials under its universal
jurisdiction statute against sitting heads of state or senior foreign officials (though trials
against former heads and former officials as well as low-level officials is permitted), and
in absentia trials are prohibited. Id.
189. The complementarity principle of the ICC appears in Article 17 of the Rome
Statute. In the head-of-state context, the United States or another national jurisdiction
would defer to an impending or on-going ICC prosecution under the complementarity
concept if it was unwilling to proceed with the prosecution of the head of state. See

376 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:332
“selective” or “premeditated” reverse complementarity in the
sense that the national jurisdiction (i.e., the United States) would
actively choose to defer to a proceeding by the ICC in the
context of a putative head of state by intentionally delaying or
withholding
domestic
prosecution.
This
concept
of
“complementarity” in the context of a trial of a foreign head of
state best supports policy goals related to the promotion of
friendly foreign relations among nations (i.e., comity) as well as
international peace and stability because such a trial represents
less of an affront to the sovereignty of the nation of the head of
state (as compared to a trial by a foreign national jurisdiction). In
addition, in the context of grave international crimes committed
by individuals such as heads of state, international tribunals like
the ICC would appear to have greater expertise and experience
with this particular type of crime.
In their attempts to formulate a doctrine for former heads
of state, US courts can draw upon both domestic and
international law to fill existing gaps, in particular when the US
executive branch declines to offer a suggestion of immunity.190
Under relevant US and international jurisprudence former heads
of state may not be prosecuted by a domestic or national court
for official acts performed while in office, but these individuals
may be prosecuted for private or commercial acts performed
during this time.191 US and other national courts have indicated
that activities like drug trafficking192 and torture193 do not
Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 17 (1)(a). Delay in prosecution is one indicator of a
state’s unwillingness to prosecute. Id. art. 17 (2)(b). A state may be unwilling to
prosecute for a variety of reasons related to foreign relations, security, and stability.
190. For a discussion of the role of executive branch guidance in determinations of
immunity for former heads of state, see supra Part I.A.
191. See, e.g., supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text (discussing US approach to
immunity for former heads of state); see also supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text
(discussing international law approach to immunity in national trials for former heads of
state). Arguably, according to the dicta in the ICJ decision of Congo v. Belgium, former
heads of state and officials no longer enjoy any immunity under international law for
suits filed after they leave office (regardless of whether the act committed in office was
“private” or “public”). See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). But since the part of the ICJ decision addressing
former-head-of-state immunity in national prosecutions was dicta, and since ICJ
decisions are technically binding only on the parties to the litigation, this aspect of the
decision awaits further development at the international level. For further explanation
of the binding nature of ICJ decisions, see supra note 177.
192. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that
drug trafficking for personal gain is a private activity conducted by a head of state).
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constitute official acts (i.e., they are “private”). Therefore,
torture and other international crimes of an intensely grave
nature, such as genocide and war crimes, could also be
considered “private.” In addition, US courts may also consider
placing domestic acts that constitute crimes of a less grievous
nature in the category of private acts. For example, “ordinary”
felonies that do not rise to the level of an international crime,
such as murder or rape, may arguably fall in the category of
private acts. Finally, certain white-collar crimes committed for
personal gain may qualify as private (e.g., bribery, embezzlement,
fraud, and similar crimes constituting felonies under local
law).194 Accordingly, absent an explicit suggestion of immunity by
the executive branch, a former head of state should not be
afforded immunity in US domestic courts for these types of acts,
and could face prosecution for them despite the fact that they
occurred while in office.
In addition, absent executive branch guidance, US courts
contemplating whether to try a former head of state may also
consider whether the head of state’s “home” country has waived
immunity for its former leader.195 Even absent such a waiver,
trials of former heads of state by US courts would tend to
generate less resentment by the “home” state, due to both the
passage of time and the lesser degree to which the former leader
would be viewed as intrinsically linked to his or her home
country. Such a waiver of immunity by the “home” state, though
not a strict requirement for a US trial of a former head of state,
would nonetheless constitute clear and compelling evidence that
193. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte)
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that former
heads of state may be tried in non-domestic national courts—for acts of torture as a
result of universal jurisdiction over these acts bestowed by the Torture Convention); see
also supra notes 118–162.
194. Immunity should still attach, however, for misdemeanor crimes because a
prosecution by a foreign court for such a crime would not generally be worth any costs
associated with such a prosecution (e.g., negative foreign policy repercussions, threats to
peace and stability, retaliatory prosecutions, etc.). In addition, immunity should still
attach for certain “justifiable” felonies such as a killing committed as part of legitimate,
state-sanctioned warfare or as part of a lawfully mandated judicial sentence. In these
particular cases, the act attributed to the former head of state should remain “official.”
195. See Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209–11 (S.D. Fl. 1993); see also supra text
accompanying note 63 (discussing waiver in the context of former heads of state); supra
notes 59–62 and accompanying text (discussing waiver in the context of sitting heads of
state).
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the nation does not consider the trial a challenge to its own
sovereignty or national interest.
Notably, under the developing concept of subsidiarity
already used by various states, US courts should consider
deferring to an ongoing impartial trial or investigation of the
former head of state in the country where the crime originally
occurred, or in a state to which there is a similarly “strong” link
to the crime.196 Such deference respects the sovereignty of the
foreign nation while also ensuring the maintenance and
promotion of peaceful relations between the foreign nation and
the United States. Such an approach also ensures similar
treatment to former US heads of state travelling abroad (e.g.,
deference by a foreign national court to an ongoing or
impending trial or investigation in the United States of the
former head of state, in those cases where the crime originally
occurred in the United States or there is a similarly “strong” link
between the crime and US interests).
Furthermore, US courts should also consider deferring to an
ongoing or pending trial or investigation of a former foreign
head of state conducted by an international forum, such as the
ICC, that has jurisdiction over serious crimes. International
criminal tribunals, such as the ICC have particular expertise and
experience in trying grave international crimes; in fact, it is often
their sole mission or purpose.197 The nation of the former head
of state will also likely view a trial by an international forum with
less disdain or contempt than a similar trial by another,
potentially rival, foreign nation; thus, a trial in this forum may
represent less of a threat to international stability. In addition,
international tribunals typically derive their authority from
multiple nations or the international community as a whole, thus
representing less of a threat to the sovereignty of the nation
whose former head of state is being tried or investigated.
Moreover, a US court’s deferral to an ongoing or pending
196. For example, deferral should occur if an impartial trial or investigation is
underway or soon to be underway by the state whose citizen is accused of or was
victimized by the crime. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (providing examples
of the existence or application of the subsidiarity principle by Germany and Spain).
197. See e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 184. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, a
hybrid domestic/international court, also has as its chief purpose the trial of
international crimes. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 105,
art. 1, ¶ 1.
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criminal case by an international tribunal case aligns nicely with
the actual practice of other states.198 Finally, such deferral falls
within the scope of the complementarity concept inherent within
the framework of the ICC, the most prominent international
criminal tribunal.199
Perhaps most significant, however, is that, in the context of
foreign official immunity, Samantar has left both the content and
scope of the foreign official immunity doctrine uncertain. Prior
to Samantar, US courts generally looked to the FSIA for
guidance; accordingly, if no exception under the FSIA applied
(e.g., waiver, commercial activity), foreign officials were
ordinarily conferred immunity for official acts performed during
their tenure in office.200 Samantar’s holding that the FSIA no
longer applies in the official-immunity analysis essentially means
that traditional common-law analysis now will be the focus of
inquiry in most foreign official immunity cases. As a result,
similar to the common-law immunity inquiry for heads of state,
executive branch guidance will begin to have a more prominent
role in official immunity cases. This, in turn, places an increased
burden on the executive branch to provide guidance in the
naturally larger number of official immunity cases (compared to
the relative dearth of cases in the context of head-of-state
immunity). As a related matter, this larger reliance on executive
branch guidance increases the risk of inconsistency and
incoherence in official immunity analysis by replacing reasoned,
precedent-based judicial analysis with more ad-hoc and
potentially politically-influenced executive branch decision
making.
As a result, courts in the wake of Samantar should use
executive branch guidance, when provided, as one factor in an
overall “totality of the circumstances” inquiry into the foreign
official immunity issue. When executive branch guidance is
provided, it should, of course, be given enhanced weight by the
courts as the valued opinion of a coordinate branch of the US
government with a particular expertise and authority in foreign
198. For a description of a similar practice of deferral by Spanish and German
courts to international tribunals, see supra text accompanying notes 164–166, 168–170.
199. For a detailed explanation of this “fit,” termed “selective” or “premeditated”
reverse complementarity, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 70 (discussing pre-Samantar cases applying FSIA in foreign
official immunity context).
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relations, and courts should generally follow such guidance
absent a strong reason to the contrary. But certain policy and
other considerations that are present in the context of head-ofstate immunity are present to a lesser degree in the context of
foreign-official immunity, and these considerations favor a more
flexible, totality-of-circumstances approach to official immunity
analysis (e.g., as a result of these considerations, executive
branch guidance should be one important factor in the foreign
official immunity inquiry, but this guidance should not be
determinative on the immunity question, as it is in the head-ofstate context). For example, while the decision to try a head of
state can have significant foreign policy implications, such an
impact is lesser in the case of a governmental official, particularly
a low-level official. In the course of conducting a full inquiry into
the immunity question for one of these governmental officials,
courts are less likely to interfere in the foreign relations dealings
of the executive, or somehow harm these relations.
Accordingly, US courts examining the immunity of a lowlevel foreign governmental official should examine not only
executive branch guidance, when it exists, but also the nature of
the conduct engaged in by the official, any waiver by the foreign
government, and whether the official engaged in a private or
official act. For example, even before Samantar, US courts
examining the official immunity issue generally refrained from
bestowing immunity for private acts committed by the official
while in office.201 In addition, if the act for which immunity was
sought constituted a domestic or international crime, immunity
was generally denied.202 This previous judicial inquiry into the
nature of the act should continue even after Samantar.203 In
addition, even though FSIA does not strictly apply after Samantar,
US courts could still look toward its provisions, particularly the
various exceptions to immunity, as suggested guidelines on the
official immunity question. Precedent cases from the preSamantar era that examined, for example, the waiver, commercial
201. See supra note 70.
202. See Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also supra note
70. If the alleged crime was committed as part of state-sanctioned warfare, courts in the
pre-Samantar era were likely to maintain the immunity of the foreign official. See id.
203. For example, when a foreign official commits a crime that is not connected to
his official state duties or commits a crime as part of a private business venture,
immunity would generally not apply.
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activity, or terrorism exceptions to immunity under FSIA, though
no longer formally applicable in the foreign official immunity
inquiry, may still serve as useful guideposts in the largely
undeveloped common law analysis for this area.204
In addition, special immunity considerations may apply in
the case of a sitting high, or senior, governmental official. A
failure to provide immunity in these cases may have serious,
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. Thus,
even if the underlying conduct by the high official was private in
nature or constituted a crime, US courts should almost certainly
defer to the executive branch in this instance.205 In addition,
apart from deference to the executive branch, trials by national
courts of sitting foreign government officials in senior positions
are generally prohibited by international law as well as the law of
several national jurisdictions.206 Only if the executive branch fails
to provide guidance, or the guidance offered was in direct
contravention of these international law norms, should US courts
undertake a more flexible, totality of circumstances analysis.

204. For a list and description of these pre-Samantar cases applying FSIA in the
foreign official immunity context, see supra note 70.
205. The US Constitution places foreign relations authority in the executive
branch; hence, generally speaking, the executive branch has not only more power in this
area but also more expertise and experience. See U.S. CONST. art. II; see also CARTER ET
AL., supra note 28, at 191 (“[T]he President has always exercised substantial foreign
relations power. Indeed, the President is often described as having the dominant role in
the conduct of US foreign relations.”). Senior government officials include heads or
deputy heads (e.g., “vice” heads) of government departments or ministries, officers with
command authority in the state military, officials directly below the head of state and
within the “chain of command” in the event of the head of state’s death or
incapacitation, etc.
206. For relevant international law on this topic, see supra notes 85–92. For
relevant Spanish law on this issue, see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777. A sitting
senior foreign governmental official can only be tried by a foreign national court under
international law once leaving office (and then only for acts committed prior to
obtaining or after leaving office, or for “private” acts committed while in office), or in
cases where the official’s home country waives immunity or undertakes the trial itself. See
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 58–61.
In the case of a contemplated US trial of a former foreign governmental official, not
only do different international standards exist but also different policy considerations
appear to apply. Former officials, even senior ones, may be tried under international law
standards in foreign national courts for “private” acts committed in office (as well as for
acts performed before entering or after leaving office). See id. Also, US trials of former
officials are less likely to impact United States foreign relations than trials of sitting
officials.
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Finally, similar to the head-of-state context, US courts
should seriously consider deferring to an ongoing or pending
international criminal trial of a foreign official, particularly a
senior one, as well as deferring to a legitimate trial of such an
official by the foreign national jurisdiction in which the alleged
crime occurred (or of which the accused or victim is a citizen).
Many of the theoretical and policy reasons discussed above in the
context of heads of state and deference by US courts to
international and certain foreign domestic proceedings (e.g.,
sovereignty and foreign policy concerns, reciprocity
considerations,
the
principles
of
subsidiarity
and
complementarity) apply with equal force in the context of
foreign officials, particularly high-ranking ones. In the case of
low-level foreign officials, a deference analysis will largely be
absent because international tribunals have primarily been
created for the purpose of trying more prominent participants in
mass atrocities and will be less, if at all, interested in pursuing
low-level criminals.207 Likewise, in terms of limiting provisions on
the application of universal criminal jurisdiction by foreign states
and their courts, these states appear not to include such a
provision in the context of prosecution of low level officials.208
Moreover, foreign nations are less likely to construe a US trial of
a low level official as an affront to their sovereignty, and
therefore foreign policy and stability concerns in this context are
diminished.
CONCLUSION
Head-of-state and official immunity jurisprudence in the
United States is in a state of flux and confusion, particularly after
the US Supreme Court decision in Samantar. Regarding heads of
state, US courts need more precise guidelines to evaluate
immunity decisions, particularly in the absence of executive
branch guidance. Developing international norms in the area of
head-of-state immunity, in combination with the limited
precedential US cases in this area, can help to provide content
for these guidelines. In addition, the vacuum created by Samantar
may be filled, in part, by drawing upon the existing head-of-state
207. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 1, ¶ 1.
208. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (explaining Spain’s limiting
principle in this area on the exercise of its universal criminal jurisdiction).
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immunity precedent, FSIA-era cases in the official immunity
context, and international law jurisprudence and codification in
this area. Nonetheless, Samantar may signal an increased number
of lawsuits against foreign officials in light of its removal of
judicial application of immunity under the FSIA. Finally, in the
context of both head-of-state and foreign-official immunity,
developing notions of subsidiarity and complementarity in the
foreign domestic and international arenas provide strong policy
reasons for US courts to incorporate these notions into US
jurisprudence.

